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1. Money Can’t Buy Me Truth? 
 1 
 
Claims about the proper method for writing the history of science are 
simultaneously claims about the relations between the producers and consumers of 
scientific knowledge.—Michael Dennis (1997, p.1) 
 
It is not hard nowadays to find people who harbor strong opinions about the 
contemporary commercialization of science, primed and willing with very little 
prompting to recount some anecdote about the travails or triumphs of Viridiana Jones in 
the Temple of Mammon. First off, there are the motley ranks of Cassandras, who, 
significantly enough, tend to have a soft spot for the Good Old Virtues of the Mertonian 
Norms, and bewail the prospect of expulsion from the prelapsarian Garden.1 They lament 
that once there may have been an invisible college, chorused sweetly in consort in the 
quest for truth, but now there are only feckless individual entrepreneurs scrabbling for the 
next short-term contract. ‘Who will now defend the virtue and purity of science?’ they 
wail. By contrast, there also stand the massed phalanx of neoclassical economists, science 
policy specialists and their bureaucratic allies, who by and large tend to reverse the 
valences, but nevertheless engage in much the same forms of discourse. For them, most 
scientists in the Bad Old Days had been operating without sufficient guidance from their 
ultimate patrons, the corporate pillars of the economy; but luckily, with a bit of prodding 
from the government, a friendly nudge from their university’s intellectual property 
officer, plus a few dollars more waved in their directions, scientists have been ushered 
into an era which appreciates the compelling logic of “technology transfer.”  At the risk 
of caricature, one might summarize their central task as the gathering of empirical data in 
order to argue that the expanding modern commercialization of scientific research has 
turned out to be ‘inevitable,’ with the corollary that there exists little evidence that it has 
“significantly changed the allocation of university research efforts” (Nelson, 2001, p.14).2 
                                                 
1
 See for instance: (Brown, 2000; Hollinger, 2000; Miyoshi, 2000; Newfield, 2003; Krimsky, 
2003; Monbiot, 2003; Washburn, 2005). Editor: Please cite here Handbook entry that covers Mertonian 
norms. 
2
 For similar assessments: the “growing commercial engagement has not, thus far, altered the 
research culture of universities, so as to privilege applied orientations at the expense of basic science” 
(Owen-Smith & Powell, 2003, p.1696); “Science today is only a short way down the path to becoming a 
toady of corporate power” (Greenberg, 2001, p.3); Do we see “universities compromising their core values 
[?]... at least at the major research universities, their revenue-enhancing activities have not seriously 
distorted such values” (Baltimore, 2003, p.1050); “There is evidence to suggest that university licensing 
facilitates technology transfer with minimal effects on the research environment” (Thursby & Thursby, 
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Admittedly, many of these purveyors of glad tidings would still regard themselves as 
arguing in favor of the preservation of an ‘optimal’ sphere of research reserved for open 
public science and pure unfocused curiosity (a ‘separate but equal’ doctrine applied to 
unspecified portions of the university), however much they would also avow that the 
economy must constitute the ultimate arbiter of scientific success in this more rational 
regime of organization. The history of science for them is simply divided into an Age of 
Confusion when ‘open science’ had unaccountably been mistakenly conflated with the 
whole of science, fostering a lack of understanding of the efficient organization of 
systems of innovation, and our own current Age of Free Enterprise, when we see the true 
situation of pervasive ownership with clarity.  This kind of crude “before and after” 
discourse has also come to dominate much of the contemporary science policy literature, 
which is filled with euphemisms like ‘technology transfer’ and ‘democratically 
responsive science’ which seek to reconcile the harsh authority of the almighty dollar 
with the delicate sensibilities of those otherwise inclined to resist the advent of the End of 
History. It has become fashionable of late to pillory Vannevar Bush for his invention of 
the notion of the pipeline ‘linear model’ which situated ‘applied science’ as the 
downstream result of ‘basic science’; now we are all supposed to know better.3 
This rather superficial Stage 1/Stage 2 narrative, be it upbeat or downbeat, has 
very little to do with the actual histories of the sciences. Sometimes this has become a 
problem in some sectors of STS as well, as we discuss below in Section 3. Part of the 
problem arises because STS has only very recently begun to come to grips with the 
phenomenon of commercialization, lagging the Cassandras and the science policy 
bureaucrats by perhaps a decade or more. The ‘commercialization of science’ turns out to 
be a very heterogeneous phenomenon, resisting simple definition. Consequently many 
contemporary discussions of the commercialization of science have proven deeply 
unsatisfying, tethered as they are to totemic monolithic abstractions of Science and The 
Market pushing each other around in Platonic hyperspace. Indeed, some historians have 
long sought to remind their readers of what one collection (Gaudilliere & Lowy, 1998) 
                                                                                                                                                 
2003, p.1052). Richard Nelson has tended to become more skeptical of this position over time, however; 
see (Nelson, 2004). 
3
 Some recent evidence begins to suggest that Bush may not have been as directly responsible for 
these ideas as has been previously thought, but that they might instead be traced to the economist Paul 
Samuelson, who helped draft Science, the Endless Frontier. See Samuelson (2004, p.531). 
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calls “The Invisible Industrialist” who occupied the interstices of numerous laboratories 
and frequented the hallways of universities since the middle of the 19th century. Yet, in 
rejecting the false polarities of the neo-Mertonians on the one hand and the economic 
apologists for the modern era on the other, it would appear that the denizens of science 
studies have of late run a very different risk of denying that there has been any significant 
change whatsoever in scientific protocols; hence important structural differences are 
overlooked that might be traced to alterations in the ways in which science has been paid 
for and accommodated within the economy over long stretches of time. One recent 
instance of this sort of attitude has been expressed by Steven Shapin (2003, p.19): 
Throughout history, all sorts of universities have ‘served society’ in all sorts of 
ways, and, while market opportunities are relatively novel, they do not compromise 
academic freedom in a way that is qualitatively distinct from the religious and political 
obligations that the ivory tower universities of the past owed to the powers in their 
societies.  
A cruder version of this orientation was captured in interview transcripts with the 
chair of an electrical engineering department (in Slaughter, Archerd & Campbell, 2004, 
p.135): 
You have to accept the fact that it [research] is going to be driven by the people 
who give you the money. [If] the state gives us money, they tell us what to do. [If] NSF 
gives us the money, they tell us what research they want done. [If] DoD gives us the 
money, [its] the government… Why is it any different with industry? I see no difference 
whatsoever. 
Yet another manifestation is the attempt by the Paris School of Bruno Latour and 
Michel Callon to reduce the economy to just another instance of the laboratory, as a 
prelude to erasing all ontological differences between scientific and economic activity, 
while chanting, “we have never been modern!”4 Strangely, this widespread ahistorical 
insistence upon ‘the way things have always been’ in science in its co-existence with the 
economy dates back to the supposed godfather of social studies of science, Thomas 
                                                 
4 See Callon (1998; in Mirowski & Sent, 2002; in Barry & Slater, 2003), and for critique, 
(Mirowski and Nik-Khah, forthcoming). One might also include Capshew & Rader (1992) in this tendency 
to see “Big Science’ back to the 17th century, although they do have the good grace to notice: “Aside from a 
surge of interest in the rise of industrial research, surprisingly little attention has been directed towards the 
economics of science… The organization and production of knowledge in such contexts bears more than a 
passing resemblance to Big Science” (p. 24). 
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Kuhn.5 In a little-read set of comments upon a pivotal conference upon the relationship of 
industrial R&D to science held at Minnesota in 1960, he insisted that “the two activities, 
science and technology, have very often been almost entirely distinct,” and indeed, that 
“historically, science and technology have been relatively independent enterprises,” 
going back as far as classical Greece and Imperial Rome! As an historian, Kuhn felt 
impelled to admit that, 
 “Since 1860… one finds that characteristic 20th century institution, the 
industrial research laboratory… Nevertheless, I see no reason to suppose that the 
entanglements, which have evolved over the last hundred years, have at all done away 
with the differences between the scientific and technological enterprises or with their 
potential conflicts.” 6 
The indisputable fact that scientists and their institutions have always and 
everywhere been compelled to ‘sing the prince’s tune when taking the prince’s coin’ in 
one form or another does not imply that the evident modern trend towards the escalated 
and enhanced commercialization of science need not or will not alter the very makeup of 
the supposedly invariant ‘scientific community,’ not to mention the nature of the 
‘outputs’ of the research process. Furthermore, the under-appreciated fact that the 
political economy of the sciences in America has been transformed from top to bottom at 
least twice over the past century has yet to be correlated with the types of science that 
have been performed in the manner which has become the trademark of science studies – 
that is, fine-grained studies of the interaction of forms of organization with the 
stabilization of knowledge claims—or indeed, the ways we tend to think about the 
successful operation (or conversely, the pathologies) of the ‘scientific community’. This 
sort of agenda was called for in the perceptive paper of Michael Aaron Dennis in 1987; 
but his entreaty has yet to be sufficiently heeded.  
Close on the heels of the enunciation of the ‘Hessen Thesis’ in the 1930s 7 and the 
subsequent Cold War anti-Marxian backlash against it, most appeals to economic 
                                                 
5
 In this respect, as in many others, we owe our awareness to the politically retrograde influence of 
Kuhn upon the questions posed within science studies to Steve Fuller. See (Fuller, 2000; Mirowski, 2004a, 
chap. 4).  
6 The first two quotes can be found in (NBER, 1962, p.452); the third comes from pp.454-5. 
7
 Named after Boris Hessen, this was an argument that the content of Newtonian mechanics owed 
much to the artisan traditions and economic structures of the 17th century. For modern research on the 
subsequent suppression of Hessen’s work and attendant economic considerations, see (McGuckin, 1984; 
Chilvers, 2003; Mayer, 2004). Editor: Please cite here Handbook Entry that may deal with Hessen. 
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structures as conditioning factors in the production of science simply dropped out of 
postwar theoretical discourse within science studies. As Dennis has written about 
American historians, the manner of “solving the problem of providing for the support of 
the material foundations of science – salaries, labs, instruments – effectively eviscerated 
the possibility of anything even remotely resembling the materialist historiographies of 
science that had developed between the wars” (1997, p.16). Something similar seems to 
have happened in Europe as well. The postwar political shift in the philosophy of science 
also played a part in repressing such questions (Mirowski, 2004a; 2004b). Consequently, 
as the next Great Transformation of research was taking place in the 1980s, science 
studies was instead turning its attention to micro-scale studies of laboratory life, ignoring 
how the laboratory’s macro-scale relationship to society was being re-engineered all 
around them, not to mention the shift in those paying for all those DNA sequencers and 
inscription devices.8 The qualitative effects of the panoply of market activities upon 
scientific research thus remain very much an open issue.  
 Curiously, expressions of concern over the potential impact of economic 
incentives upon science have instead become the province of groups who have tended to 
set themselves up in opposition to STS. Predictably, they frequently wind up their 
exercises by concluding that commercialization has not drastically changed contemporary 
science. Positing the invariance of the end-state from the mode of production of 
knowledge has itself become a veritable industry amongst those anxious to provide 
reassurance that their ‘social epistemology’ underwrites an invisible hand story in the 
sphere of scientific research: as they phrase it, that epistemically sullied motives (which 
are then abruptly conflated with ‘social influences’) do not threaten the goals of science.9  
These attitudes have taken root in the science policy community and a segment of the 
                                                 
8
 This problem of this blind spot of science studies approaches to the laboratory has recently been 
noticed by (Kleinman, 2003, chapter 5). There is the further complication that early works such as (Latour 
& Woolgar, 1979; Bourdieu, 2004) made extensive use of economic metaphors, while essentially ignoring 
any substantive economic structures. The curiosum of resort to economic metaphors while avoiding the 
economy is nicely discussed in (Pels, 2005; Hands, 2001). Nevertheless, the range of reasons behind the 
neglect of economic factors by STS in the 1970s-90s cannot be covered in this venue. The few exceptions 
to the general disinterest will be covered in section 3 below. 
9
 The most prominent advocate of such a position in philosophy is Philip Kitcher (1993), but it can 
also be found as far back as the work of Friedrich Hayek in the 1930s, which gives some idea of its neo-
liberal origins. It is also showing up in the analysis of higher education: see (Geiger, 2004; Kirp, 2003; 
Apple, 2005). For further contemplation and critique on this issue, see (Mirowski, 2004a; 2004b; 
forthcoming). 
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philosophy of science (Mirowski, 2004b; 2006b), and pervade discussion of commercial 
research in business schools.10 
 A different approach to the “new economics of science” explores the possibility 
that alternative forms of the commercialization of science actually have indelibly shaped 
both the practice of research and the contours of whatever it is that we encounter at the 
end of the process (Mirowski & Sent, 2002). One key variable turns out to be the ways in 
which that protean entity “the laboratory” was appropriated and reconstructed by higher 
education, corporations and the government over the long 20th century, a point first made 
by (Dennis, 1987). This will be the topic of Section 2 below. Another crucial variable is 
the way in which the divide between ‘public’ and ‘private’ conceptions of knowledge 
have shifted in the recent past, and how that has fed back upon the rationales for various 
actors in their exercise of the governance of science (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). 
Section 3 is an overview of this problem. A third variable concerns the modern 
phenomenon of globalization, and the ways in which it tends to undermine earlier 
nationalist and parochial approaches to the problem of the economics of science and the 
notion that there might persist ‘national systems of innovation’ (Drahos & Braithwaite, 
2002; Drori et al, 2003). In one sense, it poses an immanent critique of the previous 
sections, which is explored further in Section 4.   
 Many different groups have entered the fray in asserting their expertise to frame 
discussions of the modern commercialization of science. One can find examples in such 
far-flung enterprises as literary criticism (Newfield, 2003; Miyoshi, 2000), medical 
schools (Angell, 2004), library science (Scheiding, forthcoming), education schools 
(Apple, 2005; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004), and popular journalism (Press & Washburn, 
2000; Shreeve, 2004; Dillon, 2004; Judson, 2004; Washburn, 2005). Some political 
theorists have attempted to adapt the ‘social contract’ literature in politics to discussions 
of regime change (Guston & Kenniston, 1994; Hart, 1998). Some fields (say, for 
instance, ‘knowledge management’ specialists in business schools, intellectual property 
lawyers in law schools, or political economists in science policy units) highlight certain 
                                                 
10
 See, for instance, (Cohen & Merrill, 2003; Leydesdorff & Etzkowitz, 2005; Tijssen, 2004; 
Fuller, 2002) and recent issues of the Journal of Technology Transfer. Few are aware that such neoliberal 
attitudes towards science date back to the 1950s, when members of the Mont Pelerin Society first 
conceived of the ambition to “get the state out of the knowledge industry.” For discussion, consult 
(Friedman, 1962, chap.6; Walpen, 2004). 
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facts about the changing status of science, but neglect other equally salient facts, say, 
from legal history, the politics of education, the annals of military procurement, or 
international trade policy. Other scholars, by suggesting that advanced economies were 
becoming increasingly ‘weightless’, would graduate to a third stage of capitalism 
consisting almost exclusively of the service sector, or indeed disengage from gross 
physical production processes altogether. Of course, most people recognized that much of 
that talk bordered on delusional, but nevertheless managed to appear sensible (or at least 
fashionable) by engaging in locutions such as “The Information Society” or “The New 
Knowledge Economy”.11 Frequently, appeal to this supposed novel entity served as a 
prelude to promote subsumption of science under a more general theory of the 
‘marketplace of ideas’ (Foray, 2004; Feldman et al, 2002; Mirowski, forthcoming). 
 One might justifiably wonder if the cacophony of voices adds up to much more 
than a generalized atmosphere of anxiety. If STS is to claim to stake out a distinctive 
approach to the phenomenon of the modern commercialization of science, then it will 
need to make a fateful choice between casting the ‘constructivist’ stance as one treating 
the entirety of science as just another form of marketing (Woolgar, 2004), or else one 
stressing the essential historical instability of the commercial/communal binary as 
instantiated in actual concrete practice.  In this chapter, we stand as advocates of the latter 
position. Hence we outline one version of an STS approach to commercialization in 
Section 2; and then contrast it to some other versions in Section 3 of this chapter. 
 Once the ground has been prepared in section 2 by an analytical scheme of 
temporal periodization (albeit one grounded primarily in the American context), we shall 
then point out the differing meanings of the commercialization of science under each 
individual regime. While market considerations were never absent from the laboratory or 
the classroom, the modern commercialization movement can in no way be considered a 
‘return’ to anything like the interwar science promoted by Jazz Age captains of 
industry.12  Modern science has turned out to be a qualitatively different phenomenon 
                                                 
11
 For some economic examples, see (Danny Quah in Vaitilingham, 1999; Shapiro & Varian, 
1999; Powell & Snellman, 2004). A Google search on the term “Knowledge Economy” in October 2005 
produced an amazing 1,690,000 hits. 
12
 We believe it is important to counter such claims as: “the weakening of university-industry 
research linkages during a significant proportion of the postwar [WWII] period was the real departure from 
the historical trend” (Mowery et al, 2004, p.195 fn15), and “The so-called Mode 2 is not new; it is the 
 8 
because it has been grounded in profound historical transformations in the corporation, 
the university, and government, with consequences for their respective initiatives to 
exercise control in the organization and funding of science. We offer our limited exercise 
in this chapter more as a preliminary exemplar than a definitive template for research into 
other countries in other eras: one future task of STS might be to report similar species of 
watersheds in other disparate culture areas.13 Whether or not that comes to pass, the other 
question raised by this chapter is: To what extent does modern globalization force the 
multiplicity of social trajectories of the provisioning of science to converge to a single, 
worldwide model of commercialized science in the 21st century? If the response to that 
question is in the affirmative, then should we also expect the intellectual rationales for a 
particular mode of commercialized science to similarly be winnowed down to a few 
simplified narratives of ‘scientific success’? If that is the case, then one begins to 
appreciate the challenge that a neoliberal “new economics of science” poses to the future 
of STS.  If broad generalizations indeed become possible, then they will exist because 
corporations and governments and INGOs have been engaged in a concerted project of 
standardization spanning national and cultural and disciplinary boundaries.  
 
 
 
2. Three Regimes of 20th Century Science 
Organization 
 
STS scholars have been wary of reifying the concept of “Science” as a trans-
cultural trans-historical category, and for good reason. The more one learns about 
scientists and their livelihoods, the more one comes to appreciate the sheer diversity of 
their activities, the vast compass of their societal locations, and the multitude of ways 
their findings have become stabilized and accredited as knowledge. What keeps this 
daunting multiplicity from defeating analysis for STS scholars is the dominance of 
                                                                                                                                                 
original of science before its academic institutionalization in the 19th century” (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 
1998, p.116). STS should be devoted to explanation of what is especially characteristic of the new social 
structures of science.  
13
 Indeed, some of the best modern work in STS exploring the interface of science and political 
economy takes an explicitly comparative perspective. See, for instance, (Daemmrich, 2004; Wright, 1994; 
Jasanoff, 2005). We do not subject the European laboratory to the same regimes analysis as the American 
situation, due to space and research constraints. However, we do try and indicate some of the modern 
implications of the analysis for the European context in Section 4. 
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certain identifiable institutional structures involved in organizing scientific inquiry in the 
modern period. Scientists have not subsisted as a purely self-organized discourse 
community, contrary to the rhetoric dominant during the Cold War era. Rather, they have 
always been enmeshed in complicated alliances with and exclusions from some of the 
dominants institutions of our era: primarily, the commercial corporation, the state, and 
the university.14  
 The story of the quotidian activities of the scientist always presumes some social 
scaffolding of communal support, which in the modern epoch has been most frequently 
built up from corporate, governmental and educational [CGE] elements. Furthermore, 
various individual scientific fields will be experiencing relative growth or stagnation, 
depending upon the particular historical configurations of their own intellectual 
trajectories, in combination with the levels of encouragement provided by the CGE 
sectors. To render this set of propositions more concrete, we provide below in Table 1 a 
schematic outline of the three regimes of science funding and organization in the United 
States in the 20th century, based upon our reading of the relevant economic and social 
history, as well as the contributions of historians of science. To keep the historical sketch 
from becoming unwieldy, we have restricted the table to indications of CGE 
developments that would have direct bearing upon the constitution of the “laboratory” in 
scientific research; considerations of length preclude extension of the CGE analysis to, 
say, clinical medicine, field sciences, or purely abstract mathematical endeavors 
(although we believe these would be amenable to similar periodization). The purpose is 
to elevate to consciousness the fact that the corporation, the legal framework and the 
university have not been static over time, and that their alterations can be directly related 
to the ways in which scientists have made their livelihoods and pursued research agendas 
promoted by their immediate patrons. Thus, contrary to the prognostications of social 
scientists, there has been no single ‘Market’ that governed the evolution of science in 
America; rather, there have been multiple formats of provisioning, embedded within 
larger structures.  
                                                 
14
 We signal here our awareness of the literature that seeks to acknowledge their importance under 
the rubric of the “Triple Helix”. We shall briefly evaluate its contribution in Section 3 below, showing how 
the regimes analysis differs from their narrative. Section 4 complicates the analysis by adding a fourth 
actor, viz., the international agency. Editor: please cite here Handbook Entry dealing with definitions of 
Science. 
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Table 1 
 
 
 
The designations we have provided for the various regimes are predicated upon 
popular characterizations found in the existing historical literature. The ‘Captains of 
Erudition’ regime is so designated in honor of Thorstein Veblen (1918), who wrote one 
of the earliest descriptions of the American research university as becoming subject to 
American Regimes of Science Organization 
In the 20th Century 
 
 
Period, Regime Corporation evolving Government Corp. 
policy 
Government 
Science policy 
Science managers Higher education Pivotal 
disciplinary 
science 
1890- WWII 
Captains of 
erudition 
regime 
1895-1904 great merger 
movement: 
Chandlerian firm of  
‘Visible Hand’. 
Innovation of in-house 
R&D labs to control 
competition. 
Massive expansion 
of corporate 
prerogatives. Corps 
become legal 
agents; patents a 
major strategic 
tool. Beginning of 
anti-trust. 
Employers own 
research of 
employees. 
Almost non-
existent. 
NRC formed as 
trade assoc. lobby 
for natural 
sciences. 
General suspicion 
of government 
involvement. NRE 
fails. Wartime 
patent bounty. 
Charismatic PhD 
directs corp labs.  
Foundation 
officers run few 
elite univ. grant 
programs (on 
corporate 
principles). 
Mostly Elite liberal arts. 
Research subordinate to 
pedagogy. Science not a 
major priority. 
Foundations attempt 
reform. Labs founded. 
Chemistry,  
Electrical 
engineering 
WWII- 1980 
Cold War 
regime  
M-form, conglomerate 
diversification. 
R&D units as semi- 
autonomous revenue 
earners (due to military 
contracts). 
Regulatory capture. 
Corporate powers 
augmented; 
antitrust 
strengthened. IP 
weakened.  
Military contracts 
as industrial policy. 
Huge expansion 
Federal military 
funding and 
control. 
Military promotes 
basic science to 
defeat enemies. 
National labs. 
NSF as non-
military face of 
‘pure’ science. 
Military primary 
sci managers for: 
research univs,, 
think tanks, nat’l 
labs, corporate 
contract research 
‘Peer review’ a 
secondary inst. 
Mass education at 
expanded research 
 univs. Integrated 
teaching/research. 
 Produce dem. citizens: 
academic freedom as 
Political statement 
Physics, 
Operations 
research, 
Formal logic. 
1980- ? 
Globalized 
privatization 
regime 
Breakdown of 
Chandlerian model. 
Retreat from vertical 
integration, 
diversification. 
Corps outsource R&D, 
spin off in-house labs. 
Transnational trade 
agreements expand 
corp powers to 
circumvent national 
control. Antitrust 
weakened; IP  
vastly expanded. 
Privatize publicly 
funded research: 
Bayh-Dole, etc.  
Kill OTA. 
Science just one 
political resource 
amongst many. 
Globalized corp 
officers control: 
univs, hybrids, 
CROs, startups. 
Stock up human capital 
 for those who can pay. 
Only entrepreneurs are 
free. Sever the 
teaching/research 
connection. 
Biomedicine, 
Genetics, 
Computer 
science, 
Economics. 
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specific corporate organizational principles; it also bows in the direction of the dominant 
American school of business history based on the work of Alfred Chandler.15 The label 
indicates a very elitist and closed corporate model of the organization of science. The 
‘Cold War’ regime is a label now regularly used to designate what many now portray as a 
fleeting interlude of military dominance over science management in the period 
beginning in WWII.16 And the terminology of “globalization” is not so much an appeal to 
a fashionable concept in contemporary social theory, as it is an insistence upon a set of 
factors indispensable for an understanding of the forces that drive the current wave of 
commercialization of science. 
 
 
The Genealogy of the American Laboratory 
 
Laboratories were not something that just naturally appeared in the American 
landscape: they had to be built, and to be able to subsist as more than ephemeral entities, 
they had to be integrated into some sector of the economic infrastructure. Unlike the 
situation in Europe, large-scale laboratory science did not originate in the university 
sector in America. Rather, from the outset, it was very much a commercial initiative.  
The broad outlines of the rise of the industrial research laboratory are now well 
known.17 Everyone concedes that its origins are to be found in continental Europe, 
primarily but not exclusively in Germany, and that it was initially located in large firms 
engaged predominantly in what has become known as the “second industrial revolution”: 
chemicals, electrical machinery, railways, and pharmaceuticals. An earlier vintage of 
historiography tended to assert that the “science-based industries” simply summoned an 
implicit exigency to incorporate research activities within their ambit, in both Germany 
and the US; but modern historians have since grown much more cautious, realizing that 
the ingredients to explain the appropriation of what had previously been a specialized 
                                                 
15
 “The organizational approach to understanding big business developed by Alfred Chandler, Jr. 
has given historians a framework within which to place the research laboratory” (Smith, 1990, p.121). The 
Chandlerian approach to business history is best represented in (Chandler, 1977; 2005b). 
16
  “The postwar R&D system, with its large well-funded universities and Federal contracts with 
industry, had little or no precedent in the pre-1940 era and contrasted with the structure of research systems 
in other postwar industrial countries. In a very real sense, the US developed a postwar R&D system that 
was internationally unique” (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1998, p.12). 
17
 See, for instance, (Fox & Guagnini, 1999; Shinn, 2003; Hounshell, 1996; Budieri, 2000, chap. 
2; Mowery, 1981, 1990; Swann, 1988; Smith, 1990). 
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pedagogical device for industrial purposes would be found in a strange brew of state 
policy towards advanced education, ideologies of state-building and political rectitude, 
the rise of various notions of intellectual property, the conditions which gave rise to large 
and powerful corporations in particular political settings, and the ambition to exert 
control over burgeoning transnational mass markets in clothing, transport and 
communications, electrical equipment and patent medicines. Whereas most 
manufacturing firms had long made provisions for internal quality control, routine 
testing, and incremental process improvement, an innovation arose around the 1870s to 
expand the purview of these specialized corporate arms into patent protection, the 
bureaucratization of trade secrets and the generation of novel processes and products. It 
resembled a phase transition between the periodic use of the sciences for corporate 
purposes to something approaching the institution of bureaus dedicated to doing science 
for corporate purposes. The distinction was not always sharp, the results were not often 
that immediately striking, and the transition was not always conscious. 
The rise of the industrial laboratory was the consequence of an American pincers 
movement: on the one hand, a push to bureaucratize and industrialize (or vertically 
integrate backwards, as economists might say) something which heretofore had been 
conceived as the ineffable capacity of the individual genius, and on the other, a pull to 
adapt a purpose-built academic social formation to corporate imperatives which itself had 
only recently been stabilized in specialized educational settings for pedagogical purposes. 
Michael Dennis correctly points out that when later 19th century American figures made 
their pleas for “pure science”, they did not refer to some notion of disembodied science 
carried on for its own sake, nor to an imaginary autarkic scientific community defending 
its prerogatives, but rather to a pedagogical ideal for a species of hands-on higher 
education where teaching and research were combined in a setting relatively sheltered 
from commercial considerations. Pace Bruno Latour, the issue was not whether the 
denizens of laboratories or their proxies ‘circulated’ in the wider world, but rather 
whether laboratories themselves were a robust phenomenon that could be severed from 
the nascent research university and successfully grafted onto the multidivisional 
corporation.  The wrenching estrangement of the laboratory from its teaching functions 
constituted so dramatic a departure from its conceptual origins in the later 19th century 
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that it was not hard to find any number of academics expressing scorn for the new-
fangled industrial laboratories and their spiritually debased inhabitants, disparaging the 
public confusion of untutored tinkerer-inventors with real ‘scientists’. Yet it would be an 
anachronism to read these as indicative of some transcendental incompatibility of science 
and commerce, as Kuhn did. Rather, it makes more sense to approach them as symptoms 
of conflicts attendant upon institutional innovations in the construction of both the public 
and private spheres, still in their early stages. 
 
A] The Captains of Erudition Regime 
 
One of the most salient differences between the German situation and its 
American counterpart circa 1900 was that, by and large, the academic research laboratory 
did not substantially predate the rise of the industrial laboratory in the United States.18 
Higher education in the natural sciences and the social sciences was acknowledged to 
have been superior in the German setting at the beginning of the 20th century; it was also 
recognized as having attained an unprecedented level of state-sponsored centralization. 
The German university had pioneered the research seminar and the research laboratory; 
the pedagogical research laboratory had not yet become solidly established in American 
universities, which were predominantly devoted to moral uplift and liberal arts education 
for a narrow elite, although the forms this assumed were widely decentralized and 
diverse.19 As David Noble put it, in the 19th century ‘shop culture’ was deemed opposed 
to ‘school culture’ (1979, p.27); if anything, the universities lagged behind firms when it 
came to building and staffing labs. Indeed, far from being transplanted bodily from an 
academic to a corporate context in the US as it had been in Germany, the American 
scientific laboratory was built up almost from scratch, modulo some Germanic 
inspiration, more or less simultaneously at both sites. For instance, as early as 1881, 
American Bell Telephone experimented with the location of a new physics laboratory, 
                                                 
18
 According to (Smith, 1990, p.124), “broad-ranging research in German dye companies began in 
1890… yet these research programs do not appear to have been a model that American companies 
emulated.” 
19
 A partial exception to this generalization is the agricultural experiment station attached to state 
land-grant universities from the 1870s onwards. Their indeterminate status as scientific research poles is 
discussed by Charles Rosenberg in Reingold (1979). An attempt to project the extension service onto the 
industrial sector in the form of a bill to establish ‘engineering experimental stations’ at land grant colleges 
in 1916 was easily defeated (Tobey, 1971, p.40; Noble, 1979, p.132). 
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offering Harvard University the money to build it, as long as “professors could use 
university laboratories in work for private companies” (Guralnick in Reingold, 1979, 
p.133). MIT’s fabled ‘Research Lab for Applied Chemistry,’ originally intended to carry 
out industrial research, dated from 1908. Since dedicated university laboratories were 
rare, the academic/commercial distinction was less than distinct. Yet the siting of 
industrial research on college campuses often proved less than satisfactory for its patrons, 
mostly due to a perceived insufficiency of corporate control (Lecuyer, 1995, p.64), 
redoubling the formation of in-house laboratories. This made for an unusual political 
economy of science in early 20th century America, going some distance towards 
explaining a certain impression of ‘exceptionalism’ in the culture of science which one 
encounters among many commentators (Wright, 1999), and one that contributed to the 
fact that American scientific research achieved an advanced level of commercialization 
far more quickly than any other country by the 1930s.  It also coincided with the 
successful elevation of a subset of the natural sciences to world-class status for the first 
time in the United States, thereby raising the intriguing prospect of the existence of 
multiple institutional paths to the fortification of a research base in the course of 
economic development of national systems of research.    
Science in the American university system had gained a foothold comparatively 
late, around the beginning of the Erudition regime.20  The highly decentralized character 
of the American higher education sector at first posed an obstacle to the development of a 
scientific curriculum, although it would later prove a boon. While later historians might 
point with pride to the earlier founding of Harvard’s Lawrence School, the Yale Sheffield 
School or the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the impact of these and other 
educational institutions upon actual practices of research and the shape of American 
science were slim to negligible prior to the 1890s. The impetus for the change in regimes 
originated instead from within the corporate sector, initially in the creation of a new kind 
of in-house laboratory for commercialized science, but later in the export of corporate 
protocols and funding structures to some handpicked research universities, by way of the 
instrumentality of a few activist foundations. Hence our brief overview necessarily begins 
with a flyover of the relevant background history of the corporation. 
                                                 
20 See, for instance, Stanley Guralnick in (Reingold, 1979). 
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American historians of technology have tended to lean on the work of Alfred 
Chandler, and in particular his book The Visible Hand (1977), to provide the framework 
within which they situate their understandings of the rise of commercialized science. This 
turn of events has been slightly incongruous, partly because Chandler devotes very little 
explicit discussion to the role of industrial laboratories in his history, but also because it 
is predicated upon a fairly old-fashioned technological determinism (Chandler, 2005a). 
Set against an earlier literature that approached the corporation as a nexus of power 
growing dangerously out of control, Chandler portrayed the rise of the large American 
corporation around 1900 as a rational organizational response to technological 
imperatives of high-throughput capital intensive patterns of production, found primarily 
in the newer science-based industries, which could only be made viable through the 
parallel construction and organization of mass markets on an unprecedented scale. 
Chandler praised the Jazz Age mega-corporation for adopting centralized bureaucratic 
managerial structures and vertically integrating backwards into inputs and forwards into 
sales, advertising and market research. Although he did lightly touch upon the rise of the 
industrial laboratory (eg., 1977, pp.425-33), it is treated as just another exemplar of the 
line-and-division managerial structure to which Chandler sought to attribute the success 
of firms such as Standard Oil, General Electric and DuPont. Hence, Chandler did not so 
much proffer an explanation of the rise of the industrial research laboratory, as mutely 
point to one necessary bureaucratic prerequisite for its coming into existence. Some 
industries could have sought to ‘integrate backward’ into research, except for the 
inconvenient fact that in most cases there were no pre-existent stable structures for them 
to integrate backwards into. 
The Chandlerian narrative in science studies (Smith, 1990) should therefore be 
supplemented by legal and political considerations, which Chandler largely shunned. The 
limited liability corporation, far from being an established fixture on the American scene, 
had just undergone a period of substantial judicial fortification at the end of the 19th 
century, due to the infamous Santa Clara non-decision extending 14th Amendment rights 
to corporations (Nace, 2003), the race to the bottom of states to liberalize corporate 
charters, and the unprecedented merger movement of 1895-1904. This sudden arrogation 
and consolidation of power had not gone unnoticed, and had begun to provoke a counter-
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movement beginning with the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and continuing with the 
Clayton Act of 1914, and provoked political movements hostile to corporate dominance 
of the economy in the Progressive Era. The rise of the American industrial laboratory 
should be situated within this context, in order to appreciate some of its more distinctive 
characteristics, as well as its impact upon academic science. 
The standard popular account portrays the fin de siècle industrial lab as a sort of 
factory of innovation, churning out gadgets that became new products or improved 
production processes on demand for the corporate hierarchy. This was the image 
promoted by the Scripps Science News Service, the very first corporate-backed ‘public 
relations of science’ initiative, which began in 1921 (Tobey, 1971, chap.3). But the more 
recent literature resists this tendency to frame the lab either as a straightforward invention 
factory or as some university-science-department-in-exile21, and for good reasons. The 
prime directive behind many of the innovations growing out of the large corporation was 
the drive to control markets, to render unforeseen events manageable, and to stifle 
competition. As the government began to block direct attempts at market control such as 
explicit cartels, pools and other tied arrangements through its initiatives such as anti-trust 
prosecutions, the locus of corporate control began to shift to indirect arenas such as 
intellectual property, the imposition of technical standards, and the like. One primary 
reason that large corporations turned their attention to bringing scientific research within 
their walls in this period is that “invention and innovation were effective defenses against 
antitrust suits” (Hart, 2001, p.926), and that patents in particular but intellectual property 
in general were conceived as the best and most effective means of controlling 
competition in the early 20th century (Noble, 1979, p.89). This trend was actively 
promoted by certain US government policy moves, such as the seizure by the Alien 
Property Administration of German patents in 1919, and their licensure to American 
firms under very favorable terms (Mowery, 1981, p.52; Steen, 2001). As both case law 
and legislation were slanted in the direction of integrated corporate organization instead 
of inter-firm cartels (or other features of the German model22), “legal doctrine 
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 See (Wise, 1980; Reich, 1985, Dennis, 1987; Hounshell, 1996) 
22
 The early 20th century American stress on suppression of inter-firm governance of markets may 
account for the substantial differences in the German and American climate, which were treated as a puzzle 
by (Mowery, 1990, p.346). 
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inadvertently spurred corporate consolidation, and the consolidated corporations in turn, 
enhanced their investments in R&D… The birth of the central corporate laboratories in 
this period…. are therefore in part the product of antitrust law” (Hart, 2001, p.927). 
Legal redefinitions of intellectual property and clearer stipulations as to who 
might assert claims over the fruits in the case of scientific research were heavily 
conditioned by the shifting needs of the fortified corporation. In a move with untold 
consequences for the future organization of science, corporations managed to have the 
case law with respect to employee inventions shifted away from older labor-theoretic 
notions of the fruits of individual genius and towards a presumption of employers’ 
ownership of anything an employee might do or invent. Prior to the 1880s, the standard 
default rule was that rights to inventions were vested in employees; but first, through the 
creation of the doctrine of ‘shop right’ in the 1880s-1910s, and afterwards, through a 
series of judicial decisions which made direct reference to corporate research 
laboratories, the presumption of ownership was shifted decisively to the firm itself (Fish, 
1998).  Corporate initiatives then fed back upon general cultural images: by the early 
1920s, American court decisions began appealing to the apparently commonly accepted 
notion that invention and science was a ‘collective’ and not an individual phenomenon.23 
Nobelist Robert Millikan began to complain in the 1920s that the German research 
university did not sufficiently respect the collective character of scientific research 
(Tobey, 1971, p.219). However, the convenient notion of the ‘collectivity’ was not to be 
allowed to exude too far outside of the firm’s boundaries (as in the writings of Thorstein 
Veblen), for that might bring back the dreaded world of cartels, patent pools, 
plunderbunds and trusts. The legal bias against cross-firm combinations and joint 
ventures bore direct consequences for the existence and viability of corporate labs that 
might try and escape from the tentacles of corporate bureaucracy. While free-standing 
independent industrial labs were also founded in this period, they never caught on or 
expanded to the extent that in-house industrial research did; unlike some of the largest in-
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 See, for instance, the 1921 Wireless Specialty case (Fish, 1998, p.1176). Further, the metaphor 
which compared exploration of the laws of nature to exploration for minerals or gas deposits, which would 
dominate Kenneth Arrow’s Cold War ‘economics of innovation’ (in NBER, 1962) was already present in 
the 1911 National Wire decision (Fish, 1998, p.1194). The legal acceptance of the ideal of collective 
science in the 1920s then dovetails quite nicely with recent claims that the ‘theoretical’ treatments of the 
scientific community as a distinctly social entity in philosophy and sociology find their origins in the 1930s 
(Jacobs, 2002; Mirowski, 2004b). 
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house labs, they never conducted any world-class science; and moreover, they undertook 
contract work that did not mimic the big corporate labs, but was most often subordinate 
and supplementary to them.24 Thus, even though the research process was clearly 
becoming commercialized, it was not rendered so thoroughly fungible to the extent of 
being freely outsourced by its corporate sponsors. (The modular ‘marketplace of ideas’ 
turns out to be a much more recent phenomenon.) Hence, the particular form assumed by 
contract research in America was (and continued to be) heavily conditioned by industrial 
policy and intellectual property conventions. 
After the first generation of the Captains of Industry who had built or 
consolidated the massive industrial corporations had retired, or otherwise cashed out 
some of their gains, they or their family members decided to devote some funds to 
philanthropy (or perhaps merely engage in tax avoidance) through the creation of various 
foundations: the Russell Sage Foundation (1907), the Carnegie Corporation (1911), the 
Rockefeller Foundation (1913) are some of the better known. Assistance to higher 
education had become part of their agenda, but there arose serious questions as to the 
most appropriate way to pursue this goal. At first, grants were patterned upon other 
philanthropic practices, and when it came to academic recipients, they were pitched to 
essentially provide temporary individual outdoor relief to indigent or otherwise needy 
scholars. However, just as in the case of intellectual property, by the 1920s the focus on 
the isolated individual as the monad of science funding had gone out of fashion, and 
attention turned to the targeted application of funds to provide research endowments for 
continuing programs, reorient whole disciplines, and build new institutions. It was 
consistent with this vision that the grants were overwhelmingly channeled to private 
universities, and structured so as to concentrate ‘excellence’ in a few powerful 
institutions. As Robert Kohler put it most succinctly: “The large foundations were… 
carrying business methods and managerial values from the world of large corporations 
into academic science” (1991, p.396). In everything from recasting the research grant as a 
contract that imposed certain standards of bureaucratic accountability, to imposing the 
line-and-division managerial structure upon university administrations and departments, 
                                                 
24 See (Mowery, 1981), and the claim by (Mowery, 1990, p.347): “independent research organizations do not appear to have 
substituted for in-house research.” 
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to encouraging the creation of teams of researchers, the corporate officers who staffed the 
large foundations tended to foster the standards and practices of the large American 
corporation within their flagship research universities. As E.B. Croft of Bell Labs put it,  
It might appear that it would tend to destroy the initiative of the individual; that it 
would make it difficult to properly assign the credit and give the reward to the 
individual worker. These are all problems of administration that have had to be 
worked out. First of all we must establish in the individuals a state of mind, which 
leads them to really believe that their best results are attained through cooperation with 
others (Noble, 1979, p.119). 
 
  Harvard and Chicago would be coaxed and inspired to become the AT&T and 
Standard Oil of American higher education, surrounded by smaller and relatively 
insignificant rivals who had not learned the lessons of building a permanent and 
successful managerial hierarchy, and not inconsequentially, a strong research capacity. 
Colleges would either emphasize liberal-arts pedagogy, or would aspire to technical 
expertise in research. Consequently, the scientific research laboratory was propagated 
throughout the academic landscape as the necessary accessory to the mature corporate 
business plan. “Foundation managers allied themselves with the small but growing 
numbers of academics… who realized that [corporate] organization and management 
were good ways to keep ahead of the pack in the increasingly crowded and competitive 
world of basic research” (Kohler, 1991, p.400). 
The fact that much of the structure of the American academic science laboratory 
was inspired by that of the industrial research lab did not imply that academic scientists 
uniformly sought to mimic their industrial brethren, however. Even as the social structure 
of laboratories was becoming patterned upon corporate social structures, the academic 
scientists lauded the university laboratory as a pedagogical ideal existing separate and 
apart from commercial pressures, but also from government subsidy. Yet this quest for 
‘purity’ only exacerbated the problem of who precisely would fund and manage the 
research carried on under that banner. The nagging tension between science beholden to 
special interests versus science in pursuit of the public interest proved a challenge to 
those who apprehended the “Erudition” dynamic as a danger to democracy, such as 
Walter Lippmann, Thorstein Veblen and John Dewey (Mirowski, 2004b). The 
Foundations were increasingly targeting their funds to support very specific research 
 20 
projects in a limited portfolio, or else professionalized arenas of higher education such as 
medical schools, and could not be expected to bear the burden of the health of the whole 
gamut of sciences, much less the careers of the next generation of scientists. The National 
Research Council [NRC], established in 1916 as a sort of trade association to lobby for 
the support of the natural sciences, actually opposed direct government subvention of 
researchers (Noble, 1979, p.155). The NRC-backed drive to institute a National Research 
Fund, which would derive its endowment from corporate subscriptions, failed miserably 
in the period 1926-32 (Tobey, 1971, chap.7). Robert Millikan was denouncing federal 
support for the sciences at private universities as late as 1937 (Lowen, 1997, p.33); it 
remained miniscule. Outside of a few private universities favored by the foundations, the 
problem of sustained privatized care and maintenance of a diversified academic research 
capacity was not solved by the supposedly collectivized community of researchers, nor 
by its corporate patrons. It would not be solved until World War II. 
Nevertheless, American laboratories for the first time in their history were able to 
produce some world-class science under the Erudition regime. Whether the Nobel Prizes 
were for work originated in the academic sector, as Theodore Richards’ chemistry prize 
in 1914 or Robert Millikan’s physics prize of 1923, or from within the burgeoning 
industrial sector, as that of Irwin Langmuir of GE in 1932 or C.J. Davisson of Bell Labs 
in 1937, there was a certain American style of research which traced a part of its lineage 
to the corporate inspiration of the laboratories. European commentators noted a certain 
empiricist temper regnant, a kind of phenomenological exploration well-suited to teams 
of researchers, infused with an experimental and accounting mentality as contrasted with 
a rationalist orientation. German dominance in both physics and chemistry were still 
widely acknowledged in this period. Electrical engineering, however, found its center of 
gravity shifting westward by the 1930s. Nevertheless, America’s deficiencies with regard 
to theoretical imagination were a common theme of opprobrium emanating from the 
older and cultured precincts of Continental Europe. Chemistry, probably the most 
lavishly supported of the natural sciences in America in this era, itself produced no 
radical changes in fundamental doctrines (Mowery, 1981, p.104). One might therefore 
conclude that the corporate orientation of American science did indeed influence the 
types of research performed in this era, as well as some of the results produced. More to 
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the point, when larger cultural movements felt impelled to come to terms with the world-
historical significance of the advancement of science, most frequently it was European 
science that served as their reference point.25  
 
B] The Cold War Regime 
 
The fact that American science was utterly transformed in World War II, and then 
persisted in that novel economic format throughout the Cold War, is a widespread 
conviction hardly requiring defense at this late date;26 but it does tend to get confused 
with another notion, that mostly this was due to the rise of ‘Big Science’: the idea that 
postwar science organization was driven by scale effects, in much the same way that 
Chandler asserted that the structure of the modern corporation has also been driven by 
scale effects.27 But concentration upon abstract size and its quantification, a tendency 
often associated with Derek de Solla Price and the scientometric movement, serves in a 
way conformable with Cold War trends to lend itself to technological determinism. There 
is no doubt that the constitution of huge teams devoted to the production of a particular 
weapon or device, such as the MIT Radiation Lab, the Manhattan Project or Lawrence’s 
cyclotron, could not help but provoke revisions in the way American culture would 
apprehend the nature of the ‘laboratory’ in the postwar period. Science seemed 
increasingly to be organized around ‘gadgets’, as the denizens of Los Alamos called the 
Bomb, and the devices were Big along almost any dimension one would care to assess: 
reactors, accelerators, space vehicles, von Neumann’s room-sized computers, and so 
forth. 
 Yet, before we become blinded by the shiny surfaces, blinking lights and 
phalanxes of bench scientists, it will become necessary to direct our attention to some 
rather more pedestrian aspects of the quotidian prosecution of postwar science, namely, 
the myriad of ways in which the government, primarily but not exclusively in the guise of 
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 A good example of this is the way that various philosophical/cultural attempts to reconcile 
science with democracy or science with industry tended to struggle with Einstein’s theory of relativity. For 
a nice account of these struggles, see (Tobey, 1971, chap. 4). 
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 See (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1998; Kevles, 1995; Leslie, 1993; Kleinman, 1995; Lowen, 1997; 
Morin, 1993). 
27
 Examples of these sorts of arguments can be found in (Capshew & Reder, 1992; Galison & 
Hevly, 1992) and in the otherwise insufficiently appreciated pioneer researcher in economic themes of 
science organization, (Ravetz, 1971). 
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the military, transposed and inverted the previous understanding of the relationship 
between science and industry characteristic of the interwar period. The military, 
responding to a relative vacuum in science policy in the immediate wake of World War 
II, moved to retain access to the scientists whom had done so much in helping them to 
win the last conflict; and then when other governmental agencies were eventually brought 
into play, the political situation dictated that military innovations and military funding 
would remain the dominant consideration in science organization. The American 
government had destabilized the presumptions which ruled prior to 1940, and in altering 
its stance towards both industrial and science policy, it compelled both the corporation 
and the university to revise the ways in which science would be carried on within their 
precincts. This was the era of the now derided “linear model”: the assertion that 
innovations in ‘pure science’ were necessary formal prerequisites for advances in 
‘applied science,’ and that both made their way in an orderly fashion down the pipeline 
until ‘technological development’ resulted in the new products that drove capitalist 
expansion.28 Under the triple imperatives of classification, rationalization and projection 
of ideological superiority, the military refined the ‘purity’ of the laboratory in a different 
crucible.  As an unintended consequence, the change in regime underwrote a conviction, 
almost a dogma that science and commerce should never mix, even though this flew in 
the face of a previous generation’s experience. Gaining a better perspective on the Cold 
War regime will go some distance in dispelling the fruitless standoff between the neo-
Mertonians and the economic enthusiasts, and the Stage 1/ Stage 2 mindset with which 
we began this paper.  
The wartime experience of the OSRD/NDRC and the immediate postwar debates 
over civilian vs. military control of science have been superbly covered by the present 
generation of historians, so it need not be recapitulated here. What has been perhaps 
missing from these accounts is the ways in which the militarization of science had an 
impact on the previous regime of corporate science, as well as the ways in which the 
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 For a description of how the linear model was precipitated out of the Cold War context, see 
(Kline, 1995; Mirowski & Sent, 2002). For a brief history of its existence as a statistical category, consult 
(Godin, 2003). For the vicissitudes of its modern manifestations, see Calvert (2004). For a new perspective 
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“public good”, see (Samuelson, 2004, p. 531; Mirowski, forthcoming). Editor: Please insert cite to any 
Handbook entry that deals with basic/applied distinction. 
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American university was forced to reorient itself in order to occupy the space cleared for 
it within the postwar settlement. The most obvious alteration was the intrusion of the 
government as the third, and now largest player in the funding and management of 
science; but this implied something more than slinging largesse at a few favored natural 
sciences. It involved subscribing to a tenet that politicians were often loathe to admit, 
given their redoubled allegiance to the virtues of market organization: that the federal 
government was in the business of picking winners and losers in the realm of 
technological development by running a sub rosa industrial policy under the auspices of 
the military, which included promotion of a very different set of practices than had held 
sway before the war regarding intellectual property and antitrust. Meanwhile, the 
corporation was growing in its power and reach, given that many of its European 
competitors had been hobbled by the war. Both the government and the corporations 
were impressed by the efficacy of science in winning the late war; it was taken as given 
that it would also play a pivotal role in winning the Cold War. 
The Cold War is now regarded as the Golden Age of the Chandlerian firm. The 
line-and-division mode of management had proven its mettle during the war; through the 
1970s the roster of the hundred largest American corporations displayed amazing 
stability; since a certain equilibrium had been reached in the control of their core markets, 
the new watchword became ‘diversification’. Dominant firms in mature industries sought 
to grow by buying up new product lines and moving into newer industries, and the M-
form or multidivisional bureaucratic managerial structure spread throughout the corporate 
sector (Lamoreaux et al, 2003). As corporations became less tied to single product lines 
or nominally related competencies, the role of the corporate laboratory began to shift. 
Industrial science still assumed many of the functions it had done prior to WWII, such as 
routine testing and product improvement. Yet the increasingly multidivisional or 
conglomerate nature of the firm dictated that each division should become its own profit 
center, and that funds would be allocated within the firm according to criteria applicable 
across all divisions. Here is where the military takeover of science policy came into play. 
Not only did military funding come to dominate academic science, but it also re-
orchestrated a major portion of industrial or commercial science (Graham, 1985).  
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Because the American military did not set out with deliberate forethought and 
intention to become commander-in-chief of science policy in America, but rather found 
itself backing into the commitment fitfully and by degrees, it had to be very flexible 
about experimenting with various methods to fund and manage the scientists whom it 
wished to keep on retainer, and in the process, invented many new configurations of 
laboratories. Many point to the Manhattan Project as the first decisive military 
experiment with science organization. Although the original OSRD contracts were run 
through universities as the research entities, soon it was decided that the industrial-scale 
centrifuges and uranium enrichment research at Clinton Tennessee and the Hanford 
Works site would be contracted out to private firms—in that case, DuPont. The postwar 
legacy institutions at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, Argonne and Brookhaven were set up as 
something else which had been resisted throughout the previous regime: government-run 
“national labs” funded directly by the Atomic Energy Commission (Westbrook, 2003). 
Other sorts of research was deemed to require something other than a university or 
corporate setting, and so the Air Force and the Ford Foundation concocted a university 
campus without students or faculty combined with a non-profit Santa Monica beachfront 
resort at RAND in 1948, and thereby innovated the think tank. Finally, in the critical 
areas of aerospace, electronics and missile development, it was decided that R&D had 
best be done on a strictly commercial basis, and there the military took the fateful step 
down the road of subsidizing corporate R&D in areas where it believed there was a 
compelling national interest in maintaining supremacy at the forefront of research.29  
The dramatic reorientation of the in-house corporate lab from an internally-
oriented product development agency to an external research contractor had profound 
implications. First, and most significantly, the ability to attract military funds reconciled 
the corporate lab with the M-form corporation, in that the lab could (and often did) justify 
its divisional status by capturing its own streams of external revenue. But in order for this 
to happen, the corporate science lab had to be brought into line with the rather different 
notions of accounting, control and intellectual property propounded by their military 
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 See, for instance, (Forman, 1987; Graham, 1985; Hounshell, 1996, pp.47-50). As Colonel 
Norair Lulejian said in a 1962 speech: “Can we for example plan and actually schedule inventions? I 
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about it, the price is high” (quoted in Johnson, 2002, p.19). 
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patrons. Recently, Glen Asner has made the very interesting argument that a series of 
accounting, tax code and procurement regulations imposed by the military over the 1950s 
“provided incentives for the corporations to restructure their research programs on the 
basis of the linear model” (2002, p.4). For example, the Procurement Act of 1947 
effectively perpetuated the wartime innovation of the cost-plus contract in the realm of 
military R&D. The Department of Defense did not mind funding what would be dubbed 
“basic research” in the aftermath of WWII, because their regulations concerning 
overhead would putatively allow them to control the mix of basic and applied as they saw 
fit, and the 1954 tax code revisions allowed accelerated write-offs of new investments in 
research infrastructure, which Department of Defense sought to encourage. Here we 
observe that the basic/applied distinction, far from mapping preset divisions between 
universities and industry, was inscribed in the very contracts that propagated it, largely 
through a myriad of nearly invisible stipulations concerning the economic provisioning of 
research.30 Far from mere boondoggles, these practices had the dual effects of allowing a 
greater degree of disjuncture of the research of the corporate lab from the activities of 
other divisions of the same corporation, while at the same time allowing the lab to be 
structured more along the lines of the university. (The fact that the model had historically 
come full circle undoubtedly rendered the transition easier.)   Corporate labs were 
consolidated at locations remote from production facilities on campus-style settings, 
often justified by levels of secrecy and classification also demanded by the military. 
Scarce postwar research personnel were often courted with promises of university 
lifestyles, and a fair amount of autonomy with regard to research agendas. Bell Labs, 
Xerox Parc, IBM Yorktown Heights31, RCA Sarnoff, Westinghouse Pittsburgh, Merck 
Rahway and others became powerhouses of basic research, often enjoying substantial 
autonomy in setting their own research agendas. “A two-class system (military and 
nonmilitary) developed, with the best and brightest concentrated in the military class” 
(Hounshell, 1996, p.49). And the investment began to pay off in a more ‘academic’ 
                                                 
30
 The irony of this story is that what was rendered more ‘real’ in the industrial sector was 
simultaneously further eroded in the academic sector. See, for instance, (Lowen, 1997, p.140): “By the 
mid-1950s the claims that the programs of basic and applied research [at Stanford] were entirely distinct 
and that the applied research program was not affecting the academic program were largely rhetorical.” 
31
 IBM stands out from these other corporations as forming its in-house research capacity rather 
late, creating a “Pure Science” Department only in 1945. On this unusual history, see (Akera, 2002). The 
Yorktown Heights facility was only opened in 1960. 
 26 
modality: between 1956 and 1987 twelve corporate scientists won Nobel Prizes (Buderi, 
2000, p.110). Was it therefore so very odd that even the community of corporate 
scientists came to subscribe to the linear model, since everything seemed inclined to 
ratify its existence? 
While it was not the intention of the American military to render the industrial 
research lab transformed so that it would more closely resemble the university science 
facility, it was their intent to channel research in such a manner so as to conduct what has 
been sometimes called a ‘stealth industrial policy’.32 Specialists in funding agencies like 
the ONR, the AEC and DARPA thought they could predict which industries were making 
use of cutting-edge science to produce the technologies of the future; and under the 
imperative of national security, they could justify their interventions to make their own 
predictions come true. Their successes in the areas of quantum electronics, solid state 
physics, and computers are well known; but there were also significant initiatives in 
pharmaceuticals, radiobiology, meteorology, and catalysis. Not only did the government 
back select horses in the derby; they dabbled in equine husbandry as well. Through a 
combination of weakened intellectual property rules and fortified antitrust practices, they 
sought to breed a corporation better suited to withstand the chill winds of the Cold War.  
The American military had publicly pledged its troth to the magic of the market, 
but generally were not willing to entrust mission-critical aspects of weapons development 
or considerations of national security to the vagaries of the free market. The postwar 
innovation of systems management was constructed to plan invention (Johnson, 2002). In 
particular, the Cold War regime witnessed a policy of striking mitigation of intellectual 
property rights in areas where the military was directly involved in science management. 
Starting with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, the government asserted a policy to retain 
patent rights deriving from military-funded research, but only to make any such 
inventions that arose available to American firms on a non-exclusive royalty free basis.33 
The policy was both chauvinistic, in the sense that national security dictated the subsidy 
of American firms, but also anti-monopolistic, in the sense that national security would 
                                                 
32
 See (Hart, 1998, pp.227-9; Teske & Johnson, 1994). 
33
 See (Westbrook, 2003, p.51). The policy was not uniformly applied to industrial contractors, but the second-source rule often 
mitigated any commercial advantage that the firm might enjoy from keeping patent rights. Interestingly enough, the supposedly public-spirited 
University of California resisted the AEC rule, and was defeated. 
 27 
be compromised if the military were to become inordinately dependent upon any single 
firm. Such considerations also governed the “second source rule” promulgated by the 
Department of Defense, which conveyed the intellectual property surrounding critical 
weapons systems or military technologies to a second competitor firm, so that the 
fortunes of no single producer would constitute a bottleneck. 
Not only was the military skeptical of the virtues of strong protection of 
intellectual property in frontier science, but so too were the economic experts that (for a 
time) dominated antitrust policy in the US. In the 1940s the Department of Justice 
adopted the position that one of the more deleterious effects of monopoly was the 
suppression of technological innovation, and filed suits against some of the nation’s most 
high-technology companies of the time, such as DuPont, Alcoa, IBM and General 
Electric. Compulsory licensing of patents became for the first time a common element in 
antitrust settlements (Hart, 2001, p.928). The effect of these policies, in consort with 
military regulations, was to induce firms to pull back to some extent from acquiring the 
promising technologies of would-be competitors, or to play down the aggressive pursuit 
of patent infringement cases against major rivals, and to pour more of their resources into 
their own in-house labs. The result, under the banner of national security, was an 
oxymoronic regime of relatively open science hedged round by classification and 
secrecy. 
It is through this Cold War lens that we can come to better understand the ways in 
which academic scientists could come to believe in the independence and isolation of 
their ivory tower. The military was convinced that encouragement of a certain format of 
higher education was an indispensable complement to the protection of national security. 
In stark contrast with the Erudition regime, postwar public policy was aimed at sustained 
subsidy of academic science beyond the narrow scope of few private universities, 
although those fortunate institutions also benefited immeasurably under the new regime. 
Indeed, one might suggest that it was only during the Cold War that the totality of 
economic sectors embraced higher education as an exercise in American nation-building, 
with all that might imply: mass education, a diversified research base, a democratic 
ideology, open science, and the open propagation of research results. The military played 
a major role in fostering this system, primarily through the innovation of overhead 
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payments on research grants, but also through more fleeting initiatives like the GI Bill 
and generous fellowships. The objective was to fuse teaching and research into a single 
symbiotic system, held together by the glue of generous funding. 
It was a fateful decision early on at the OSRD to keep most contract research tied 
to university settings, and to reconcile university administrators to that fact with lavish 
subsidy. Vannevar Bush arbitrarily proposed overhead payments of 50% of labor costs 
for university research grants (although his real allegiance was demonstrated by the 100% 
rate proposed for corporations); and although the magnitudes of the subsidy were the 
subject of some controversy during the war, universities learned to deal with the 
inconveniences of having to subject these payments to bureaucratic accountability and 
oversight (Gruber, 1995). Although some university administrators were convinced that 
the postwar period would return rather quickly to the Erudition regime’s dependence 
upon industrial contract research, other more visionary captains were impressed by the 
sheer magnitude of military largesse. As Robert Hutchins of the University of Chicago 
admitted in a memo in June 1946, “It seems likely that within the next five years the 
Government will become, directly and indirectly, the principal donor of the University.”34 
Those who were willing to go along with the drastic shift in patronage thereby stood a 
chance of stealing up on their rather more hallowed and prestige-laden competitors. MIT 
notoriously took advantage of the opportunity to climb the league tables (Leslie, 1993). 
In 1946, Stanford managed to accumulate military contracts that were twice the value of 
its contract research during the entirety of WWII (Lowen, 1997, p.99).    
It may seem that the saga of the Cold War regime could be sketched entirely 
without consideration of the role of the private foundations; but this would not be 
altogether valid. Older foundations continued programs of academic subsidy, and a few 
new players, like the gargantuan Ford Foundation, came upon the scene (Raynor, 2000). 
However, a government crackdown on the use of foundations as tax shelters in 1950, 
combined with the fact that even the largest foundations could not begin to match the 
magnitude of impact of the federal government on higher education and science, meant 
that most foundations scaled back their ambitions concerning the management of science. 
For instance, in 1960 the Ford Foundation was channeling more support to American 
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universities than the NSF; but by 1970 it had all but withdrawn from the support of 
academic science (Geiger, 1997, p.171). Foundations became notorious for their fickle 
initiatives, which could disappear with each executive change; they were no longer 
participants in science management for the long haul.35 
Hence, the American Cold War regime was largely structured as a concertedly 
nationalized system of science, but one whose ideological significance was so highly 
charged that it had to be presented as an autonomous and autarkic invisible college of 
stalwart stateless individuals who need pay no heed to where the funding and institutional 
support for all their pure research was coming from. ‘Purity’ had become conflated with 
‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’; “science” stood as the embodiment of all three states of 
virtue; and American science organization was promoted as a rebuke to the Soviet 
machine, but equally it was thought to stand as reproof to anyone who sought to make 
science submit to an imperious political master.36 It was only within the Cold War regime 
that ‘academic freedom’ really seemed to possess sufficient gravitas to actually be used 
in an effective defense of academic tenure—something we can now appreciate in the era 
of its disappearance. The researcher had only to answer to his disciplinary peers, or in the 
last instance, to his individual conscience, and feel an enlightened disdain for the hurly-
burly of the marketplace – at least until the DARPA grants officer came to call.  
 
 
C] The Globalized Privatization Regime 
 
 The advent of the globalized regime of privatized science was not heralded in 
such an unmistakable way by war or depression, as were the previous regimes. A 
superficial perspective might seek the watershed at the Fall of the Berlin Wall, since, 
after all, it was the most dramatic event that signaled the cessation of the Cold War. 
However, if we triangulate between corporate evolution, educational transformation and 
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government policy, the inauguration of the privatization regime in America would have 
to be located a decade or so earlier. 
 Economic historians, legal scholars and science studies researchers all tell the 
story in somewhat different ways, but it is significant that they all trace the 
metamorphosis back to roughly 1980.37 The trigger seemed to be the widespread 
conviction that the United States had lost ground to international competitors during the 
oil crisis and economic slowdown of the later 1970s. Although there was substantial 
disagreement over the causes of the supposed sclerosis, an array of initiatives were 
launched in order to defeat the diverse culprits sapping America’s economic dominance. 
One major candidate for economic reform was the organizational structure of the 
Chandlerian corporation (Lamoreaux et al, 2003; 2004; Langlois, 2004). Various 
participants had become convinced that the huge managerial conglomerate had become 
too unwieldy to effectively compete in the world market in the 1970s, and the 1980s were 
the era of hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts and shareholder attacks on the top 
management of large corporations. In response, there was a significant retreat from 
diversification within firms, with one calculation suggesting that by 1989 firms had 
divested themselves of as much as 60% of acquisitions made outside of their core 
business between 1970-82 (Bhagat et al, 1990). There was also a retreat from previous 
levels of vertical integration in industries like automobiles, computers, 
telecommunications and retail. Consequently, corporations began to equate agility and 
nimbleness with repudiation of hierarchical managerial control of process, and with it the 
M-form paradigm, and thus sought to re-engineer the supply chain to depend to a greater 
extent on market co-ordination.38 Networks of sub-contracts began to displace ownership 
ties as modes of organization; venture capital began to channel investment into startup 
firms. Labor-intensive heavy manufacturing was outsourced to low-wage countries.  
Moreover, the roster of America’s largest corporations underwent severe shakedown, 
after having enjoyed relative stability for the previous sixty years. The lumbering giants 
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were prodded into defensive action, which was widely interpreted as a return to market 
methods of co-ordination (Langlois, 2004). 
 Another important initiative was deployed in the arena of organization and control 
of international trade. In a far-sighted mobilization, a handful of representatives of 
corporations located in high-tech industries such as pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, 
computers and entertainment formed the International Intellectual Property Alliance in 
1984, for the purpose of linking issues of intellectual property to larger trade 
negotiations.39 They succeeded beyond their wildest ambitions, using the Uruguay Round 
of negotiations over the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to impose US standards 
and levels of intellectual property protection upon developed and developing countries 
alike, and to enforce them with trade sanctions through the World Trade Organization. 
TRIPS [Trade-Related Intellectual Property System] came into force on January 1, 1995, 
and has implanted the basic legal premises of the globalization regime to all corners of 
world, refashioning academic and corporate activity in the interim.40 Although focused 
on the seemingly narrow legal playing field of intellectual property, one might regard 
TRIPS as one facet of an even larger concerted political movement to weaken the 
prerogative of national governments to exert regulatory control over the corporate entities 
within their boundaries, all in the name of a liberalization of trade and the protection of 
foreign investment. In any event, manufacturing capacity was shifted to lower-wage 
countries in search of a quick productivity boost.  
 These major restructurings of the corporate sector coincided with a crisis in the 
sphere of higher education. After 1975, enrollments in US higher education ceased to 
grow for the first time in US history, while cash-strapped states began to contract their 
funding. (Geiger, 2004, pp.22 et seq.). The military, under pressure to reduce funding of 
projects not immediately relevant to its mission, had been attempting to withdraw from 
many of its commitments to the funding of academic science in the 1970s, so universities 
suffered a double deficit, with no end in sight. In order to maintain graduate enrollments, 
many departments in the sciences began to admit rising proportions of foreign students 
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(NSB, 2004, p.5-25). While this had salutary effect upon the rather parochial atmospheres 
of American university towns, it also had the deleterious effect of revealing the essential 
bankruptcy of the Cold War justification of education as serving the objectives of state-
building. Many of the students in technical areas were not citizens of the US, and 
periodically some politician would ask what universities were doing training the work 
force of potential competitors at American expense. But more to the point, the whole idea 
of an informed citizenry and skilled workforce began to lose salience as more and more 
production activity was shifted overseas, and corporate managerial cadres became more 
international. The university was losing its grip on its previous social raison d’être , even 
as it remained the preferred path for individual economic advancement. It also, in an 
ironic twist, was revamped in a Chandlerian direction, even as many corporations were 
fleeing that organizational model in droves. Significant aspects of faculty governance 
were diminished or dismantled altogether (Geiger, 2004, p.25), and were replaced with 
top-heavy managerial hierarchies who multiplied divisions, institutes and other offices, 
often in the name of rationalization and cost-saving. Costs were more directly addressed 
by replacing tenured faculty with temp labor and part-time teachers; but this reversed the 
Cold War tendency to unite teaching and research as mutually reinforcing activities. 
 And then there was the overt political attempt to bring the hobbled universities 
more into line with the re-engineered corporation. It has become de rigueur for 
commentators noting the commercialization of science to bow in the direction of the  
Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 as a major turning point in the treatment of intellectual property 
in the US, because it allowed universities and small businesses to retain title to inventions 
made with federal R&D funding, and to negotiate exclusive licenses.41 Actually, the 
historical situation with regard to intellectual property was much more complex, and yet, 
the end result was almost a complete reversal of practices under the Cold War regime. 
First off, universities had been permitted on a piecemeal basis to patent federally funded 
research via individual Institutional Patent Agreements since 1968 (Mowery et al, 2004, 
p.88). Only in 1983 was Bayh-Dole style permission extended to large corporations, their 
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real intended beneficiaries, by a Ronald Reagan Executive Memo—the better to fly under 
journalistic radar (Washburn, 2005, p.69). Second, Bayh-Dole was only one bill in a 
sequence of legislation throughout the 1980s which expanded the capacity of 
corporations to engage in novel forms of collaborative research while capturing and 
controlling their products (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2002, p.86). For instance, the 
Stevenson-Wydler Act of 1980 opened the door to commercialization of research 
performed at the national laboratories. The National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) 
of 1984 shielded corporations from antitrust prosecution when engaged in joint research 
projects. The National Technologies Transfer Act of 1989 allowed federally-sponsored 
research facilities to spin-off previously classified research to private firms. Over the 
same period corporations sought and won numerous laws to strengthen both patent and 
copyright, and in 1982 managed to have a special Court of Appeals in the Federal Circuit 
dedicated to patent cases. The scope of what is susceptible to patent in America has been 
progressively broadened, and challenges to the legitimacy of patents have become less 
successful.42 The very notion of a public sphere of codified knowledge has been rolled 
back at every point along its perimeter, initially by blurring the lines between public and 
private property. This hyper-restrictive system of intellectual property has then been 
exported to the rest of the world under the aegis of the WTO and the World Intellectual 
Property Organization, as outlined above. 
 The concerted fortification of intellectual property was accompanied by the 
weakening of antitrust policy, in exact reversal of the Cold War regime. Absolution was 
not just granted in the specific case of the NCRA, but more generally under the influence 
of the Chicago School of law and economics, monopoly was increasingly downgraded as 
a source of inefficiency or political danger in the viewpoint of the Justice Department 
(Hart, 2001; Hemphill, 2003; van Horn, forthcoming). The doctrine was propounded that 
monopoly was not necessarily harmful to innovation (even in the case of US vs 
Microsoft), that size of R&D budget was not correlated with demonstrated ability to 
innovate, and that good products win out in the end, no matter what the industry 
structure. In any event, defenders could point to the increasing resort to cross-licensing 
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and joint ventures to suggest that there was no return to the bad old days of trusts and 
patent pools (Caloghirou et al, 2003). Rather, a fortified and unfettered corporate sector 
free to contract for research when and where it saw fit was thought to be one of the best 
prophylactics against upstart foreign producers, and looming national economic decline. 
 The cumulative consequence of all these convergent vectors was a fateful 
restructuring of the American corporation and the most important revision in the 
organization of science within the regime of globalized privatization: the relative demise 
of the in-house corporate research labs, and the spreading practice of the outsourcing of 
corporate research.43 It is here, and not in any vague shift in the Zeitgeist or narrative of 
the rationalization of technology transfer, that we find the root cause of the new model of 
commercialization of science in the 21st century. While each of the trends we have 
identified above was not deliberately attuned by itself to bring about the destruction of 
the in-house corporate lab, each contributed to its demise. It is important to understand 
the ways in which the withdrawal of the military from science management, the 
perceived failure of the Chandlerian firm, the push to globalize the neo-liberal 
Washington consensus, and the crisis of higher education all converged upon the 
corporate lab. 
 Pundits in business schools often attribute the passing of the large corporate lab to 
the supposed empirical observation that big in-house research labs don’t deliver the 
goods (Anderson, 2004), usually accompanied by reference to some neo-liberal doctrine 
that in the long run healthy science resists being planned, but this superficial analysis 
ignores the fact that the labs had been weaned from their internalist parochial commercial 
orientations by military contracts during the Cold War (Graham, 1985). The corporate 
labs had been permitted to maintain their external orientation and unfettered curiosity and 
campus ambiance as long as they were revenue centers for the firm, but when the military 
withdrew from the organization and funding of basic research, then the semi-autonomous 
corporate lab became a liability. In a more forgiving environment, perhaps they might 
have been reoriented back more concertedly to the development side of R&D, and 
persuaded to renounce the linear model of technological change, but by the 1990s they 
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ran up against the anti-Chandlerian movement to divest the firm of its extraneous product 
lines and scale back on vertical integration.  In many corporations, the research division 
was a prime candidate for downsizing or spin-off, and that is precisely what happened 
throughout the 1990s. RCA Sarnoff was first sold off to SRI International, and soon 
thereafter spun off as Sarnoff Corporation in 1987. AT&T slashed research at Bell Labs 
starting in 1989, only to spin off the remnant as Lucent in 1996 (Endlich, 2004). 
Westinghouse Pittsburgh was first decimated, and then sold off to Siemens. Research 
divisions disappeared altogether at firms such as US Steel and Gulf Chevron. By 1995 
IBM had eliminated a third of its research budget, essentially gutting its flagship 
Yorktown Heights facility; other units, such as its Zurich laser group, were spun off as 
separate firms. After the merger of Hewlett-Packard and Compaq and the spin-off of 
Agilent, the renowned HP Labs were slated for reorganization and downsizing (Markoff, 
2003). The historian Robert Buderi, who has been most concerned to document this 
phenomenon, admits that research directors regarded it as a “research bloodbath” in the 
late 1980s and 1990s (Buderi, 2000, p.22), but has sought to paint the bloodletting as a 
proscription for both corporate and scientific health. The problem with this diagnosis is 
that it is too narrowly focused upon the individual firm in isolation, and ignores the larger 
system of the funding and organization of science. Buderi writes, “We now see less basic 
research going on. IBM does not chase magnetic monopoles anymore, but should it have 
done so in the first place?” (2002, p.249) This presumes someone somewhere else will 
take up the chase for magnetic monopoles, and someone else will worry about where and 
how that will happen. But this question of who organizes which science to what ends is 
precisely the debate that is glaring in its absence in the Globalized privatization regime. 
 The downsizing and expulsion of in-house corporate labs has not implied a 
corresponding contraction of private funding of research and development in America; 
quite the contrary. In a pattern that has been mimicked with a lag in other countries, in 
the US, federal R&D expenditures as a proportion of the total R&D has declined 
continuously since the late 1960s, while the proportion of R&D expenditure originating 
in the industrial sector has increased from the same period, surpassing the federal 
proportion around 1980 (NSB, 2004, p.O-11). 
    [Insert Figure 1 Here] 
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 If corporate labs are being slashed, how could this be? The resolution of these 
seemingly contrary trends is that the increased volume of research is being performed 
outside of the boundaries of the corporations funding it. Some of it is being performed in 
other corporations purpose-built for research under the new regime, while the rest is 
increasingly performed in academic and hybrid settings. It is precisely at this juncture 
that the other historical trends described above of the globalization of corporate trade and 
investment, and the crisis of the research universities, come into their own. 
 The breakdown of the Chandlerian model of the hierarchical integrated firm has 
prompted the nagging question: Why integrate R&D into the firm when you can buy it 
externally, and reduce costs by doing so? But that question presumes that R&D is a 
distinct fungible commodity in a well-developed market, one so competitive that it can 
lower the costs relative to doing it yourself. One major thesis of this chapter is that, no 
matter how ‘commercialized’ science may or may not have been in the previous 
 37 
American science regimes, until recently this state of affairs that was uniformly absent. 
The strengthening of intellectual property, the weakening of both domestic antitrust and 
the ability of foreign governments to counter corporate policies, the capacity to shift 
research contracts to lower-wage and easier regulatory environments and therefore 
engage in regulatory arbitrage, the availability of low-cost real-time communication 
technologies, and the presence of an academic sector which was willing to be restructured 
to surrender control of research to its corporate paymasters: all of these were necessary 
prerequisites to seriously countenance the corporate outsourcing of research on a mass 
scale.  
 The globalization of corporate R&D is one of the characteristic hallmarks of the 
new regime. Of course, multinational companies headquartered in smaller countries like 
the Netherlands and Switzerland have internationalized their R&D activities essentially 
from their inception; but the more striking trend is the international outsourcing of 
research across the board since the 1980s (Reddy, 2000, p.52). Just as with recourse to 
academic capacity, global outsourcing tends to be concentrated in a few industries, such 
as pharmaceuticals, electrical machinery, computer software and telecommunications 
equipment. Nevertheless, surveys within these industries reveal a sharp increase in 
research carried out beyond the home country’s boundaries from the 1960s to the 1990s 
(Kuemmerle, 1999). A more recent survey by the Economist Intelligence Unit reveals the 
globalization of R&D gathering pace over the 1990s, with over half the respondents 
indication they would expand their overseas R&D investment in the next three years. 
When queried as to the major considerations governing their decision, the most popular 
responses cited strong protection of intellectual property, lower costs and the tapping of 
indigenous research capacities. It is the access to lower wage labor in the context of an 
academic infrastructure, which is disengaged from any corporate obligations to provide 
ongoing structural support for local educational infrastructure, which explains the shift 
in research funding to countries like China, India, Brazil and the Czech Republic (EIU, 
2004, p.9). Another way to cut costs is to disengage the firm from nationalist appeals to 
help support scientific infrastructure, accompanied by improved opportunities to further 
reduce or avoid corporate taxation. 
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 Approaching the commercialization of science from this angle profoundly revises 
the usual narrative of the privatization of modern academic science as a straightforward 
case of cash-strapped universities following the money, albeit with a few nagging qualms 
concerning the propriety of telling corporations only what they want to hear.44 Rather, a 
new STS historiography might be proposed where many of the novel institutions of 
globalized privatized research were first pioneered outside of the academic sector per se, 
as adjuncts to the modification and re-engineering of the modern corporation, and only 
then have been foisted on universities forced to react to these benchmark citadels of the 
new globalization regime in their own internal restructuring of scientific research.45 
Government revisions of policies with regard to intellectual property or educational 
subsidy may have constituted incentives, but could not unilaterally impose the structure 
of the new regime. While legislation such as the Bayh-Dole Act were enabling, they 
should not be confused with the cause of the privatization of science, which was instead 
attributable to the larger shift in the nexus of science management and funding.46 
Indeed, one of the great unspoken presuppositions of modern commentators on 
the commercialization of science is that the either the scientist or the community at large 
is still capable of choosing ‘how much’ public open science one wants to preserve, while 
leaving the remainder to be covered by the private sector.47 Contrary to this presumption 
that one can rationally choose a menu in any combination from Column A and Column 
B, once the institutional structures of the globalized privatization regime have been put in 
place, then the very character and nature of public science is irreversibly transformed. 
One can observe this in the recent rivalry between Celera and the public Human Genome 
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Project. In a fascinating journalistic account of the race, James Shreeve clearly finds 
Craig Venter a more compelling protagonist than Francis Collins, and equally clearly 
subscribes to modern neo-liberal doctrine that the free market produces better research 
more cheaply than does the hierarchical managerial model, and yet almost in spite of 
himself, demonstrates in numerous ways that once the commercialized Celera entered the 
arena, then the public genome project found itself buffeted and transformed in mutations 
beyond its control. For instance, because it was committed to open science, the faster the 
Human Genome Project went, the more it ended up helping Celera to beat it to the finish 
line (Shreeve, 2004, p.198). In another instance, no matter how loudly Venter trumpeted 
that Celera was not costing the taxpayer a single dollar, if anything his project depended 
on public subsidy in ways more elaborate but more dubious than the public genome 
project, in that at least the latter was subject to some forms of public accountability that 
Celera could effortlessly flout. Knowledge was secondary for Celera; it was fencing off 
the genome that trumped everything else. “The key was for Celera to be proactive, to 
grab as much potential intellectual property as possible and sort out later who really owns 
what. Celera was getting a late start” (Shreeve, 2004, p.231). One might also worry that 
the quality of the ‘finished’ genome was substantially degraded by the various stratagems 
induced by the public/private rivalry carried on in the glare of journalistic scrutiny. The 
ultimate irony was that Craig Venter the consummate entrepreneur still conceded too 
much of his proprietary information to other scientists to suit his own paymasters, and 
therefore was unceremoniously ejected from Celera in January 2002, after the news 
spotlight had moved on. 
 
3. Alternative Market Models of the Conduct of 
Scientific Research 
 
Ever since the field of science studies broke away from Mertonian sociology of 
science, its adherents have proven reticent when it comes to discussing macro-scale 
structural attributes of science, which of course includes the economics of science. This 
made it difficult for STS to coherently discuss the framework of the Cold War regime 
during that era, although interest has revived in that topic in more recent times. 
Nevertheless, back then, the task of providing an overview of the Cold War regime 
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devolved instead to the science policy community, and thus to a great extent, to 
neoclassical economists. The major proponents of market models of science from the 
1950s to the 1980s were a group of economists primarily associated with RAND during 
that era. It was they who introduced the now-pervasive habit of treating knowledge as if it 
were production of a “thing”, on a par with any other commodity in their analytical 
framework. Yet these analysts did not think of themselves as market fundamentalists, but 
rather styled themselves left-leaning defenders of the necessity of sustaining public 
science through public subsidy, and maintaining academic science as effectively removed 
from industrial R&D. The achieved this by means of the analytical construct of the 
“public good”.48 
The artifice of the ‘public good’ was one conceptual attempt within the tradition 
of neoclassical economics to justify the intrusion by the government into the marketplace 
by insisting that there were a few anomalous ‘commodities’ that did not posses the 
standard attributes expressed in orthodox economic models. In particular, these goods 
would be produced at “zero marginal cost”, which would suggest that standard 
equilibrium pricing (where price=marginal cost) would lead to the underprovision of the 
good, or worse, it not getting produced at all. Often the public good was saddled with 
further anomalous characteristics, such as ‘non-rival consumption’ (the condition that my 
consumption of the good would not diminish or otherwise hamper your consumption of 
the same good) and ‘non-excludability’ (the producer could not prevent you from also 
using the good through standard property rights), which were cited to buttress the 
stipulation that markets would fail in providing adequate levels of the good. One still 
encounters extended rhapsodies on the special character of that market item called 
“information” or “knowledge”, which are little more than unwitting repetitions of the 
original Cold War doctrine.49 Although there is no necessary analytical connection, the 
terminology of ‘public good’ has been frequently contrasted with ‘private knowledge,’ 
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 The neoclassical approach to science, along with some of the founding documents, can be found 
in (Mirowski & Sent, 2002), especially pp. 38-43. The economists’ role in creating a new political identity 
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fn.3 supra.  
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 See, for instance, (Foray, 2004, chap.5; Guena et al, 2003; David, 2003; Washburn, 2005, p.62; 
Shi, 2001). The genealogy of the “economics of information” is covered in (Mirowski, forthcoming). 
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and thus used to suggest that the ‘public commons’ or our scientific birthright is being 
violated and encroached upon by a nefarious enclosure movement (Boyle, 2000; Lessig, 
2001, 2004; Nelson, 2004).  
There are plenty of reasons to think that the concept of the ‘public good’ was 
never a very useful or effective tool with which to understand the economics of science in 
any era, much less the current one. Although it was often cited to justify the lavish public 
subsidies of scientific research in America during the Cold War, it mainly served to 
distract attention from the military and chauvinistic motives for science funding, not to 
mention the ways in which corporate organization and academic science were 
intermeshed, as described in the previous section. The treatment of knowledge as a 
fungible thing was also the thin end of the wedge of the neoliberal attack upon putative 
distortions in the ‘marketplace of ideas’, a thrust which ran counter to the prevailing 
portrayal of science as an activity that transcended mundane political economy. After all, 
public good theory only maintained that it was ‘inconvenient’ or ‘inefficient’ to privatize 
some portion of knowledge production, not that the institutions of scientific research 
would be fundamentally undermined or corrupted in crucial respects by commodification.  
And then one could only maintain the fiction that science produced a tangible ‘thing’ by 
not looking too closely at the actual practice of research in its social context: the idea of 
‘scientific method’ as a free-standing technology indifferently portable to any situation 
was the obverse side of this image. But the irony which we intend to highlight here is 
that, just as the “public good” concept was losing its prior rationale – both because of the 
transition from the Cold War to the Globalized Privatization regime, and because of a 
trend within neoclassical economics away from treating knowledge as a thing and 
towards treating the agent as information processor (Mirowski, 2002) -- some segments 
of the science studies community began to pick it up and adapt it for their own purposes.  
Science studies scholars were not particularly quick off the mark to notice that the 
funding and organization of science had been undergoing profound transformation.50 By 
the mid-90s, it had become commonplace to observe that the average scientific career 
was experiencing deformations – lengthening of the period (through postdocs) after the 
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 One notable exception was (Dickson & Noble, 1981). An early wake-up call was (Slaughter & 
Rhoades, 2002), first published in 1996. 
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doctorate but prior to first academic position, greater bureaucratic surveillance, more soft 
money positions, increased incidence of joint authorship (or no credit at all), a 
‘productivist’ ethos – and that this might tend to undermine the Mertonian portrait of 
scientific norms (Ziman, 1994). At that juncture, at least two groups of scholars began to 
write about changes in the ‘mode of production’ of knowledge leading to a postacademic 
or revolutionary kind of science. One group has become known as proponents of “Mode 
1/ Mode 2” analysis, while the other is retailed under the rubric of the “Triple Helix.” 
The first appearance of the Mode 1/Mode 2 characterization of modern science 
was the multi-authored New Production of Knowledge (Gibbons et al, 1994). The book 
did not contain a systematic empirical survey of concrete science in any particular culture 
area, but rather a discursive set of observations about what it felt like to pursue a research 
career in the present in what was clearly assumed to be an American or European setting 
(Mode 2), while comparing it to a past situation (Mode 1) which the authors clearly 
thought would be fresh in the memories of most of their readers. That book pointed to 
phenomena such as a weakened university structure, the general erosion of the power of 
scientific disciplines, the atrophy of peer control as internal guidance system, the rise of 
interdisciplinary research teams, and the demise of the self-sufficient laboratory. This 
first book did not focus attention upon the commercialization of the university per se, but 
instead portrayed research in general as becoming forced to be more responsive to 
external interests and concerns. A second volume by a subset of the previous authors, Re-
thinking Science (Nowotny et al, 2001), ventured further in the direction of casting Mode 
2 as a change in the epistemological presumptions of the actors. This time, they were 
prompted by critics to acknowledge some events like the demise of the Cold War and the 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, but was cast in cultural categories, such as the existence of 
a “new form of economic rationality”(p.37), or postulating that “the rising tide of 
individualism in society has now reached scientific communities” (p.103), rather than 
dealing with any specific concrete economic institutions or practices. A later contribution 
to a symposium on their work (Nowotny et al, 2003, pp.186-7) led to the following 
condensed characterization of ‘Mode 2’: 
• “Mode 2 knowledge is generated within a context of application… 
[which] is different from the process of application by which ‘pure’ 
science generated in theoretical/experimental environments is applied” 
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• Mode 2 is marked by “transdisciplinarity, by which is meant the 
mobilization of a range of theoretical perspectives and practical 
methodologies” 
• “Much greater diversity of the sites at which knowledge is produced, and 
the types of knowledge produced.” 
• “The research process can no longer be characterized as an ‘objective’ 
investigation of the natural (or social) world… traditional notions of 
‘accountability’ have had to be radically revised.” 
• “Clear and unchallengeable criteria, by which to determine quality, may 
no longer be available.” 
 
In this overview, they also assert that their scheme provided “a more nuanced 
account than either of the two standard [alternatives] – characterizing commercialization 
as a threat to scientific autonomy (and so, ultimately, to scientific quality); and as the 
means by which research is revitalized in both priorities and uses” (2003, p.188). 
Elsewhere, one of the authors maintained Mode 2 “does not represent yet another attempt 
to cajole universities into behaving more like businesses” (Gibbons, 2003, p.107). While 
the later emendations did indeed complicate the earlier versions of the argument, there 
was no denying the fact that “knowledge” was still being treated as a thing and a product, 
and that the authors maintained a mildly positive stance towards the modern 
developments. 
The “Triple helix” [3H] thematic has not been as extensively codified in any 
particular text, by contrast with the “Mode 1/Mode 2” doctrine, but its themes were 
spread throughout numerous special journal issues and edited volumes which tended to 
derive from NATO-funded conferences convened by Henry Etzkowitz and Loet 
Leydesdorff. The ‘triple’ in the 3H referred to the insistence that one must look 
simultaneously at the three sectors of industry, government and academia and their 
interactions—a precept at first resembling our own STS analysis above.51 However, and 
more to the point, Etzkowitz in particular argued that universities were experiencing a 
“second academic revolution”: the first was the incorporation of the research function 
along side the teaching function, and the second is purportedly the reconciliation of 
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authors to introduce what they consider to be evolutionary considerations, as well as a spate of terminology 
found more frequently at the Santa Fe Institute, such as “co-evolution”, “lock-in”, and other forms of 
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economic development with those prior two functions. “The organizing principle of the 
Triple Helix is the expectation that the university will play a greater role in society as 
entrepreneur” (Etzkowitz, 2003, p.300). He envisions the genesis of an “entrepreneurial 
university” which is capable of carrying out all the requisites of commercialization 
without in any way impugning teaching or research, and has repeatedly pointed to MIT as 
the exemplar of this novel form (Etzkowitz, 2002). In 3H, sheer entrepreneurial zeal is 
proposed to overcome many of the scruples which have dogged the commercialization of 
science: “In this information-based economy, knowledge can be a public and a private 
good in one and the same time” (Etzkowitz et al, 2000, p.327).  It appears that the new 
regime blurs even the institutional distinctions that would have seemed central to 3H, 
such as corporation/university: “the university and the firm are each assuming tasks that 
were once largely the province of the other” (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 1998, p.203). 
This permits adherents of 3H to be coy about whether universities are urged to simply 
adapt to new demands, or instead, universities and corporations as structures are 
converging to some single new institutional entrepreneurial entity (Shinn, 2002). By 
contrast to our account, the metaphorical language of ‘dynamics’ in fact absolves most 
proponents of 3H from delving in detail into what sets the educational sector apart from 
the government or the firm, either in structure or in functions. 
Both Mode 2 and 3H authors have acknowledged that their ‘paradigms’ are 
effectively pitted in analytical competition with one another; and in one or two places, 
they also admit that they intend their work to “pose a challenge to STS.” 52 Some science 
studies scholars have acknowledged the challenge, and in so doing they have not been 
happy with what they encountered. In a series of sharply critical commentaries, they have 
found both Mode 2 and 3H wanting as both history and contemporary science policy, and 
have asked themselves what therefore accounts for the widespread attention paid to these 
literatures.53 While most have indicted the Mode 2 literature as lacking any demonstrable 
empirical component, the situation within 3H is more complex. 
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 The critiques summarized in this paragraph are taken from the following sources: (Delanty, 
2001; Elzinga, 2002; Shinn, 2002; Pestre, 2003; Bassett, 2003; Ziedonis, 2004). 
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 The Mode 2 authors argue in ways more reminiscent of philosophers of science, 
identifying an altered ‘epistemology’ without paying too much attention to which specific 
agents may experience this epiphany, much less dissecting the institutions that might 
foster it. The 3H authors by contrast have encouraged much specific research into 
questions of science policy and education in a wide array of countries and culture areas 
(often presented at their biannual conferences); but the sense of the critics is that it still 
does not add up to a coherent analysis. Instead, Globalization is treated as a benign 
diffusion of an entrepreneurial spirit to universities in the periphery (Etzkowitz, 2003, 
297). For instance, when Etzkowitz writes specifically about MIT, it is “less a history 
than a brief for the university as an engine of economic development” (Bassett, 2003, 
p.769). Elsewhere, 3H authors briefly note that corporate R&D is increasingly 
outsourced, but reveal little curiosity about the forms that it takes or what causes may be 
behind it (Etzkowitz et al, 1998, p.55). Intellectual property issues insufficiently 
explored. 
But what then has proven so attractive about Mode 2 and 3H? In our opinion, and 
that of the critics, they both provide a convenient big tent for authors who seek to 
“legitimate a neo-corporatist vision of the world” (Shinn, 2002, p.608). In the case of 
Mode 2, this tends to be addressed to higher education bureaucrats and scholars in the 
humanities located in the hegemonic developed nations, whose fears need to be assuaged:  
Can the universities enter into this new closer relationship with industry and 
still maintain their status as independent autonomous institutions dedicated to the 
public good? The answer must be in the affirmative. (Gibbons, 2003, p.115) 
 
In the case of 3H, in our experience it tends to appeal more to scholars located in 
developing countries, or else scholars located in peripheral areas of the developed world. 
They tend to be much more directly active in local science policy, and cannot take 
acceptance of the neoliberal dogma of free market globalization for granted to quite the 
degree that their counterparts in America can manage. Their research infrastructure does 
not enjoy the self-confident reputation of the major world universities, and therefore 
those individuals find they must pay much closer attention to the manner in which local 
governmental units and multinational corporations openly impact their attempts to 
provide some adequate level of high-quality education and research. Nonetheless, their 
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activities require a generic analysis that does not appear to be too closely shackled to any 
specific local conditions, be they legal niceties, local educational customs, or distinct 
nationalist aspirations for alternative development paths. The generic character of the 
analysis and lack of legal specificity will help facilitate publication in hegemonic (often 
English language) journals or other outlets that might otherwise remain closed to the 
foreign scholars. While they often must appear responsive to their local constituencies 
who regard globalization with great suspicion, in the final analysis they are put in the 
difficult position of expressing qualified endorsement of commercialization initiatives 
which are often imposed from without: for example, WTO mandated changes in 
intellectual property, government-mandated cuts in public education expenditures, or 
multinationals contracting for research with a limited cadre of entrepreneurial scientists 
in their targeted areas of interest.54 In this manner, 3H has become just another symptom 
of the globalization that has made itself felt in every university, corporate lab and 
government research facility throughout the world over the past two decades. 
Both Mode 1/Mode 2 and 3H exhibit the same drawback we have identified in the 
introduction to this chapter: they adopt a stark before/after approach to modern 
developments in the funding and organization of science, and then inflate them up into 
all-purpose doctrines which ultimately provide a generic imposition of the neoliberal 
mindset upon their local higher education infrastructure, and, if pertinent, any 
government-organized scientific research capacity.  They serve up palatable versions of a 
neoclassical economics of science as a public good, leached of all the actual technical 
content, which if more openly espoused might both repulse and dismay the sorts of 
clientele whom they are pledged to serve. In a caricature of the neoliberal economist, they 
end up simply presuming that any marketized science whatsoever inevitably enhances 
freedom, encourages expanded participation, and improves overall welfare. 
This is not the place to summarize and critique the rise of neoliberal theories of 
the economy and the state since World War II.55 It will suffice to suggest that 
neoliberalism differs from its classical predecessor through its transcendence of the 
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classical liberal tension between the self-interested agent and the state by reducing both 
state and market to the identical flat ontology of the neoclassical model of the economy. 
“Freedom” is thus conflated with entrepreneurial activity, and state functions are 
‘rationalized’ by reducing them to market relationships. Hence the blurring of distinctions 
between university and corporation, or ‘public vs. private’ science found in both Mode 2 
and 3H are derivative representations of the larger neoliberal agenda. This dictated that 
education should no longer serve Humboldtian ideals of creating a solid citizenry and 
fostering cultural development, but rather should be treated as just another fungible 
commodity (Friedman, 1962). Since poor people would never be able to afford much of 
it, and certainly very little “higher education,” it follows that they would be relegated to 
role of passive consumer, while a corporate class of experts would effectively define and 
steer scientific research.56 The kind of science that would sustain a research infrastructure 
is that science which would be one responsive to the needs of corporate customers (who, 
conveniently, had in the interim become more interested in outsourcing their R&D). 
Neoliberalism is very much a top-down project, while under its sway ‘democracy’ has 
been redefined to encompass pro-corporate “free market” policies interspersed with 
highly stylized and commercialized “elections”. 
The new economics of science that we believe is better oriented to conform with 
STS research in general accepts that some form of economic underpinnings have always 
shaped the organization and management of scientific research, but that because there is 
no such thing as a generic market, there has never anywhere existed a fully constituted 
“marketplace of ideas”.57 Since markets are plural and do not produce identical results 
either over time or between various cultural areas (much as the nature of commercialized 
science in America differed dramatically between the three regimes identified in Section 
2 above), it becomes all the more imperative to specify in detail the fine structure of 
operation of each of the major players in the course of the organization of science: 
universities, corporations, and governments. The disaggregation of science into its 
component structures (laboratories, clinics, field stations, classrooms, libraries, 
conferences) and the disaggregation of its managers into diverse agents (academics, 
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corporate officers, government representatives, corporate trustees) is the first step 
towards constructing a sociologically-aware account of the economics of science, and 
not, as has been the tendency of Mode 2 and 3H, to blur them all together into a 
homogeneous entrepreneurial agent. Who pays whom, and who answers what to whom 
has consequences for the sorts of knowledge fostered. It behooves analysts to pay closer 
attention to who performs the labor in the laboratory under which diverse circumstances; 
to ask how findings are published or otherwise promulgated; to trace the flows of 
physical items between laboratories and corporations; to itemize the forms of attribution 
and audit which are brought to bear; and to inquire what institutions and customs 
constitute and sustain ‘the author’. Where and in what manner the various components of 
the university become commercialized (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Kirp, 2003) matter 
as much for the health of science as do other more obvious variables, such as the 
identities of the various fields presumed to hold the greatest promise for conceptual 
advance and commercial development. The recent innovation of the commodification of 
“research tools” in particular bears profound implications for nearly every aspect of 
scientific research, most of which have not been adequately explored by neoliberal-
influenced science policy analysts.58 It does not further analysis to simply presume that 
science as a whole is a production process that extrudes a thing-like entity called 
“knowledge”; indeed, the attempt to reify and commoditize information is itself an 
artifact of the modern privatization regime: a process that can never succeed in its 
entirety, because complete codification and control of a reified information would 
paralyze scientific inquiry.  
This statement is not hyperbole. Take for instance, the assertion found in 3H and 
elsewhere that the university and the corporation are converging to a single commercial 
entity. While it is certainly the case that universities may be observed to behave like 
corporations in progressively more elaborate ways, ranging from the exploitation of 
trademarks to outsourcing wage-intensive functions, very few universities are willing to 
altogether relinquish their special non-profit status and the range of perquisites which 
attach to their educational location in the national infrastructure. The very few that do, 
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such as the University of Phoenix, have very clearly opted out of maintaining in a serious 
research capacity; and therefore they are little better than digital diploma mills. Most of 
the commercialization of existing universities in the 1990s was due to a relatively small 
cadre of natural science faculty in alliance with some entrepreneurial academic 
administrators who wanted to exploit commercial opportunities while still enjoying all 
the fruits of their non-profit status. Their bonanza has been the Trojan Horse which 
opened up the rest of the university to a whole range of neoliberal “reforms”. If, contrary 
to all present evidence, universities eventually really did become corporations, then one 
might anticipate that the myriad functions now combined on one campus would 
fragment, spun off due to centrifugal forces. Libraries would disappear (Kirp, 2003, 
p.114); expensive vocational schools (like teaching hospitals) would devolve as separate 
units; downmarket research for hire would migrate to contract research organizations 
located in separate research parks, along with ‘technology transfer offices’; theatres and 
concert halls would go it alone; low-cost ‘distance education’ would decamp in search of 
cheap foreign labor; and dormitories would be sold off as public housing. 
The fundamental crux of the modern economics of science is that, contrary to 
boosters such as (Bok, 2003; Baltimore, 2003; Thursby & Thursby, 2003), it may very 
well be that the current configuration of the commercialization of science is neither stable 
nor viable. Corporations are interested in academic science as long as it cuts costs – that 
is, as long it still receives the panoply of subsides which accrue to it in its separate non-
profit status. As Slaughter & Rhoades (2004, p.308) put it, “Academic capitalism in the 
new economy involves a shift, not a reduction, in public subsidy.” But the mere fact of 
commercializing university research puts that status and those cost advantages in 
jeopardy. Already, state legislators in the US expect their flagship universities to “float 
on their own bottoms”; universities in the UK are expected to attract foreign students. 
The imposition of “Revenue Center Management” to units within the university begins 
the process of restructuring there that has already occurred in the post-Chandlerian 
corporation (Kirp, 2003, pp.115-128). The more that teaching is disengaged from 
research and farmed out to non-faculty and other migrant labor, the less of a political case 
can be made that integrated expensive specialized research facilities should be 
maintained. And whyever would anyone want to leave a large cash legacy as a bequest to 
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a private university that was a profitable corporation? The more that natural science 
faculty become enfolded in their corporate roles, holding down two or more jobs, the less 
they will be willing to cross-subsidize their poorer ‘colleagues’ in the social sciences and 
humanities. How much longer can an increasingly privatized and balkanized educational 
sector expect to receive any state or philanthropic subsidy on an ongoing basis? 
 The current beneficiaries of the commercialization of academic science may very 
well be destroying the goose that laid their golden egg. 
 
 
4. Globalization of Science in the Modern World 
System 
 
If there is no simple sense in which it can be asserted that corporations and 
universities are converging to a single institutional model, that does not therefore imply 
that there is not underway some larger convergence of diverse ‘national systems of 
innovation’ to a relatively uniform ‘advanced’ transnational model of the 
commercialization of science. The logic of the spread of multinational corporations 
would seem to suggest the possibility of something like this situation coming to obtain, 
especially since the barriers between differing economic systems collapsed after the fall 
of the Wall. Various forms of anecdotal and narrative evidence equally suggest a trend 
towards convergence in university systems over the last two decades. 
In response to a common perception that the United States had been outpacing 
Europe in science and technology, Europe has been on the forefront of fostering 
educational convergence. On the teaching front, the aim has been to make higher 
education in Europe converge towards a more transparent system that involves the 
constituent countries using a common framework based on three degrees: Bachelor, 
Master, and doctorate.59 These efforts started with the so-called Sorbonne Declaration 
signed in May 1998 by the ministers in charge of higher education of France, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, and Germany. They thereby pledged to harmonize the architecture of 
the European higher education system. The next step involved the signing of the Bologna 
Declaration in June 1999 by 29 European ministers in charge of higher education. This 
lay the foundation for establishing a European Higher Education Area by 2010 in an 
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effort to promote the European system of higher education worldwide. These declarations 
were followed by the Prague Communiqué in 2001 and the Berlin Communiqué in 2003, 
which further emphasized the need to make the European Higher Education Area 
attractive to the rest of the world. Critics have argued that this Area has no coherent 
pedagogical or intellectual basis. Instead, the framework is mostly a money saving 
measure that reduces overcrowding by getting students out of the classroom and into the 
work force.  
The so-called Bologna process fits into the broader framework of the “Lisbon 
objectives,” which constitute the research equivalent of the European Higher Education 
Area.60 With regard to scientific research, the aim of the European Union has been to 
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. 
These efforts originated with the Lisbon European Council of 2000, which sought to 
bridge the gap with the United States and Japan by coordinating research activities and 
laying the foundation for a common science and technology policy across the European 
Union. It was followed by the setting of specific targets at the European Summit of 
Barcelona in 2002. This set the stage for establishing a European Research Area by 2010, 
which is referred to as “an internal knowledge market,” considered a research and 
innovation equivalent of the “common market” for goods and services, and meant to 
establish “European added value.” In the process, the European Union is to increase its 
global expenditure on research to 3% of GDP — one and a half times the current level — 
by 2010 and the share of research funded by business is to rise at the same time. 
Evidence of convergence to some model of the commercialization of science also 
abounds in the individual member states of the European Union. For instance, after two 
decades that witnessed an exodus of top students and scholars as well as a decrease in 
government support per student by 15%, Germany now plans to form a group of ten 
American-style elite universities in 2006 and award almost $30 million a year for five 
years to increase their competitiveness and quality (Bernstein, 2004; Hochstettler, 2004). 
Its attempts at American-style reform further involve the establishment of alumni 
organizations to raise money, the selection of students, and the payment of faculty salary 
based on performance. These efforts run counter to Germany’s long-held egalitarian 
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ideal. Additional culture clashes include the fact that German universities have no 
infrastructure of alumni nurturing, no tradition of alumni bequests, no endowment, and 
no fees. Critics warn of dangers and unintended consequences due to the difference in 
cultural context between the United States and Germany and the distinct social roles of 
universities in the two countries. In their opinion, these plans have more to do with past 
problems such as the burden of bureaucracy and lack of financing than with an effort to 
regain the luster German universities lost some time ago.61 
In the United Kingdom, recent reforms include the Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE) and the Teaching Quality Assessment (TQA) (Hargreaves Heap, 2002).62 The 
former was introduced in 1986 as a mechanism of control. Its main purpose is to enable 
UK higher education funding bodies to distribute their public funds for research 
selectively on the basis of quality by making universities accountable for their use of 
public money. It is conducted roughly every four years and since 1992 about £5 billion of 
research funds, which constitutes the bulk of the research component of the so-called 
Block Grant, has been allocated using the RAE. The effect of the RAE has been to 
concentrate funds at top institutions as well as to increase research activity. A rather 
worrisome response has been an increase in private-like research. The teaching 
equivalent of the RAE, the TQA, involved visitors coming into universities for a week. 
Though nominally a teaching evaluation, it was mostly a check on bureaucratic 
procedures. Moreover, it was unbelievably costly and so onerous that it was abandoned 
and replaced by institutional audits. Since the survival of universities now depends on 
their RAE score, most effort at British universities goes into augmenting scores, while 
teaching gets neglected. 
Wrenching experiments in privatization can be found in, for instance, Japan 
(Brender, 2004; Miyake, 2004), where national universities are being transformed into 
independent administrative agencies in what is being billed as the biggest higher-
education reform in more than 100 years, thereby forcing them to seek funding from 
companies and other outside sources. The result has been an effort on the part of the 
                                                 
61
 See (Hochstettler. 2004): “But the elements that work so well in America simply cannot be 
transplanted into the German context and expected to solve the problems now confronting German 
universities. In the final analysis, Germany must find a way to re-establish its academic pre-eminence on its 
own terms.” 
62
 See http://www.hero.ac.uk. 
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national universities to make more discernable scientific contributions to industry. Going 
further, many Chinese universities that have rushed to nurture start-up firms under 
pressure of the country’s open-market policy, strained national budget, and drastic cuts in 
university funding. And some Chinese universities are operating companies on their own. 
Critics feel that the education reform in Japan, while presented as a way to give 
universities more autonomy, is mostly an excuse to reduce financial support. They fear 
that the changing governance structure plunges universities into an uncharted and ill-
conceived era of competition, where government tries to have it both ways in retaining 
control by setting up evaluation committees and advisory boards. Of the latter, the faculty 
advisory board oversees academic matters and an advisory board comprised of industry, 
government and education leaders oversees management and finances. 
In short, there appears to be a global effort to reduce the putative advantage of the 
United States in science and technology, while at the same time limiting the amount of 
government support and reducing the accompanying bureaucracy. Universities have 
responded to these trends by raising money from the private sector, conducting more 
privatized research, and shifting their attention away from teaching. In the process, they 
have encountered cultural barriers due to the fact that non-American universities perform 
a different societal role than those in the United States, and exist in a different CGE 
environment.  
 
The neoliberal perspective would suggest that the national research systems were 
merely responding to a uniform market pressure to render their academic sectors more 
efficient, but just as in the national case, this analysis would miss too much of the 
concerted activity which produces such epoch-making departures. In particular, we would 
insist that it is necessary to expand our previous CGE analysis to take into account a 
fourth class of actors in the modern world system. Science has not only been promoted by 
firms, governments and universities, but increasingly in the 20th century it has also been 
organized and funded by international agencies who have propagated commercialization 
and standardization of research practices and institutions. These agencies may be divided 
into three classes: {A} the World Trade Organization, which has spread and enforced 
standardized rules of intellectual property and trade in services under the guise of 
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providing stable platform for international trade (Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002; Sell, 
2003); {B} the United Nations, which through UNESCO and WIPO has promoted 
international science policy; and {C} a raft of International Non-Governmental 
Organizations (INGOs), which play a crucial role in the spread of the globalized 
privatization regime (Drori et al, 2003).  
An earlier Mertonian approach tended to treat science as subsisting beyond or 
outside of politics, but nothing reveals the obsolescence of this belief better than an 
inventory of the means by which particular scientific institutions have been spread by 
these international organizations. Some, of course, are merely the international arms of 
linkages of national professional organizations of scientists, and as such conform to prior 
images of the self-organization of science. But increasingly after WWII, these have been 
politically oriented INGOs that combine both scientists and laypeople into activist groups 
seeking to spread a model of ‘best-practice science’ in the name of economic and 
political development. 
Figure 2 goes here 
Cumulative Foundation of Science INGOs, 1870-1990 
[Drori etal, 2003, p.84] 
The activities of these INGOs goes some distance in explaining how it is possible 
that corporations can begin to take advantage of a globalized standardized research 
capacity in such a wide range of cross-cultural settings, as suggested above. The 
pervasive similarities of science policies in almost all of the developed world, and now, 
increasingly, those parts of the developing world where corporate R&D is moving in the 
near future (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2004) is due in large part to the work of INGOs 
in propagating a generic culture of commercialized research in parochial national 
education systems and government bureaus of science policy. The implications of this 
push to standardization extend far beyond the simple spread of something like a 
“scientific world view.” For instance, standardization of scientific institutions and the de-
legitimation of local knowledge is a necessary prerequisite for the globalization of for-
profit higher education (Morey, 2004) as well as the harbinger of the outsourcing of 
much routine scientific labor to low-wage countries. The university sector is the next 
major economic area slated for a serious round of downsizing, cost-cutting and 
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outsourcing in the advanced metropolitan countries, and STS scholars will appreciate this 
this will have unprecedented effects on the content of research just over the horizon. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The analysis of the new regime of globalized privatization will depend upon the 
theoretical orientation which is accessed in order to understand what is becoming a very 
wide-ranging and pervasive phenomenon. Most existing work, based upon neoclassical 
economics, has ignored or misunderstood many of the phenomena covered in this 
chapter. In its place, we advocate a new political economy of science, which joins up 
with recent developments in STS, to produce an independent analysis of the effects of 
commercialization upon the practice of modern science. 
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